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Topics in Network Formation Theory.

Gilson, Eric.

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Topics in Network Formation Theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Topics in Network Formation Theory./
作者:	Gilson, Eric.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	122 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-05A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3741356
ISBN:	9781339336374

Topics in Network Formation Theory.
Gilson, Eric.

Topics in Network Formation Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 122 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.

This thesis examines the game-theoretic foundations of strategic network formation. Network formation theory is a relatively new subject that borrows techniques from game theory. Before this thesis, there was no formal examination of its game-theoretic foundations. In this thesis, we take the first steps in building this foundation.

ISBN: 9781339336374Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Topics in Network Formation Theory.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Eddie Dekel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.
520 $a This thesis examines the game-theoretic foundations of strategic network formation. Network formation theory is a relatively new subject that borrows techniques from game theory. Before this thesis, there was no formal examination of its game-theoretic foundations. In this thesis, we take the first steps in building this foundation.
520 $a Chapter One deals with a broad class of games, games where agents receive a signal about the outcome which is less informative than the entire strategy profile. Network-formation games exhibit this feature; thus, Chapter One lays the foundations for my subsequent work. In this environment, Conjectural Equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept because it takes the signal function into account. This Chapter deals with the epistemic foundations of Conjectural Equilibrium and how they relate to the epistemic characterizations of Nash Equilibrium in the literature. That is, Conjectural equilibrium is related to more fundamental assumptions about players' beliefs and rationality.
520 $a Chapter Two provides the epistemic characterization of two standard network theory solution concepts: Nash Stability and Pairwise Stability. Through the epistemic characterizations we find that the logic underlying these two solution concepts differs from their usual network-theoretic justification. Nash Stability is more general than the graph resulting from a Nash Equilibrium of the game; instead, it is the graph of a conjectural equilibrium. Pairwise Stability does not require explicit coordination between agents; instead, agents must be boundedly rational and optimistic. These results provide new justifications for the solution concepts, which expands the range of situations where they are reasonable to use.
520 $a Chapter Three fills one of the gaps in the foundations of network formation theory: the use of Rationalizability. Rationalizability had not been examined in network formation games, because it typically provides no restrictions on strategies. We address this issue by applying Ambrus's Coalitional Rationalizability. In addition to considering what is rational for an individual, Coalitional Rationalizability also includes group deviations. We show that Coalitional Rationalizability has several desirable properties for this type of game. Coalitional Rationalizability can be characterized directly in terms of graphs and links rather than indirectly, via strategies in the associated network-formation game. It always contains a Nash Stable network and a Pairwise Stable network.
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