東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Strategic communication with verifia...

Woo, Hee Yeul.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Strategic communication with verifiable messages.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic communication with verifiable messages./
作者:	Woo, Hee Yeul.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	127 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-04A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3737051
ISBN:	9781339261423

Strategic communication with verifiable messages.
Woo, Hee Yeul.

Strategic communication with verifiable messages. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 127 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2015.

Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition: In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what extent electoral campaigns can raise awareness of issues and unravel information about candidates' political positions. We allow for microtargeting in which candidates target messages to subsets of voters. A candidate's message consists of a subset of issues and some information on her political position in the multi-dimensional policy subspace spanned by this subset of issues. The information provided can be vague, it can be even silent on some issues, but candidates are not allowed to bluntly lie about their ideology. Every voter votes for the candidate she expects to be closest to her but takes into account only the subspace spanned by the issues that come up during the campaign. We show that any prudent rationalizable election outcome is the same as if voters have full awareness of issues and complete information of policy points, both in parliamentary and presidential elections. We show by examples that these results may break down when there is lack of electoral competition, when candidates are unable to use microtargeting, or when voters have limited abilities of political reasoning.

ISBN: 9781339261423Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Strategic communication with verifiable messages.
LDR:05357nmm a2200313 4500 001 2119508
005 20170619071238.5
008 180830s2015 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781339261423
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3737051
035 $a AAI3737051
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Woo, Hee Yeul. $3 3281386
245 1 0 $a Strategic communication with verifiable messages.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2015
300 $a 127 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Burkhard Schipper.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2015.
520 $a Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition: In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what extent electoral campaigns can raise awareness of issues and unravel information about candidates' political positions. We allow for microtargeting in which candidates target messages to subsets of voters. A candidate's message consists of a subset of issues and some information on her political position in the multi-dimensional policy subspace spanned by this subset of issues. The information provided can be vague, it can be even silent on some issues, but candidates are not allowed to bluntly lie about their ideology. Every voter votes for the candidate she expects to be closest to her but takes into account only the subspace spanned by the issues that come up during the campaign. We show that any prudent rationalizable election outcome is the same as if voters have full awareness of issues and complete information of policy points, both in parliamentary and presidential elections. We show by examples that these results may break down when there is lack of electoral competition, when candidates are unable to use microtargeting, or when voters have limited abilities of political reasoning.
520 $a Political Awareness, Naive Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning: During electoral campaigns, candidates raise political issues and provide information about political positions, not only on their own but also on their opponents'. We study to what extent negative campaigning promotes voters' political awareness and unravels information about candidates' political positions. Candidates are aware of all relevant issues, and know preferences of each voter, while voters are not aware of all issues and uncertain about candidates' political positions. A candidate's verifiable message consists of a subset of issues and information about all candidates' political positions only on the raised issues. We show that every outcome under unawareness and incomplete information is equivalent to the outcome under full awareness and complete information even if voters are ``naive''. This unraveling result is achieved in the presidential elections with public campaign message, while with microtargeting of voters in the parliamentary elections. After restricting candidates to campaign only by issues, we relate the current model to the Downs model of electoral competition. We show that this issue-campaigning model of multi-dimensional policy spaces can be mapped into a Downs-type model in which candidates set policy points in a unidimensional policy space but affect preferences of voters as well, which we interpret as framing of voters.
520 $a Bidirectional Communication and Disclosure of Product Information: We study whether bidirectional communication between the buyer and the seller achieves the seller's disclosure of sufficient product information. The buyer has perfect and private information about her preference types, while the seller has perfect and private information about his product types which can be horizontally differentiated. The buyer is allowed to truthfully reveal her preference type at some positive cost before the seller sends a costless and verifiable message about his product type. We provide a condition, called partial-vertical differentiation under which there emerges only a sufficient-disclosure outcome at which the buyer makes a purchasing decision that would be made under complete information. Moreover, such an outcome is achieved even though the buyer never reveals her preference type. If products are partially-horizontally differentiated, bidirectional communication may not yield a sufficient-disclosure outcome even with an infinitesimally small but positive cost. Using an example, we discuss that with a lower cost, the buyer is more inclined to reveal preference type, hence, bidirectional communication is more likely to achieve a sufficient-disclosure outcome. Lastly, we show that under some restriction requiring commonality of the seller's beliefs, the seller's pessimistic beliefs or the buyer's skeptical beliefs achieve unraveling even with partially-horizontally differentiated products.
590 $a School code: 0029.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a University of California, Davis. $b Economics. $3 1674951
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-04A(E).
790 $a 0029
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3737051