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Essays on costly verification in mec...

Patel, Rohit.

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Essays on costly verification in mechanism design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on costly verification in mechanism design./
作者:	Patel, Rohit.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	97 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-02A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3724345
ISBN:	9781339078243

Essays on costly verification in mechanism design.
Patel, Rohit.

Essays on costly verification in mechanism design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 97 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.

Mechanism design problems are typified by an asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent(s), where the agent has private information about her own type. The sticking thorn in a mechanism designer's problem is the agent's willingness to lie about her private information, and hence the need for the principal to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible. A particularly helpful tool in such settings is the ability of the principal to independently verify the type of an agent. Verification can be costly, thus making the decision to verify a strategic one. This work studies costly verification in three different mechanism design settings to understand how it affects decision making and interacts with other tools, such as money burning, that can be used to enforce incentive compatibility.

ISBN: 9781339078243Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays on costly verification in mechanism design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Rakesh Vohra.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.
520 $a Mechanism design problems are typified by an asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent(s), where the agent has private information about her own type. The sticking thorn in a mechanism designer's problem is the agent's willingness to lie about her private information, and hence the need for the principal to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible. A particularly helpful tool in such settings is the ability of the principal to independently verify the type of an agent. Verification can be costly, thus making the decision to verify a strategic one. This work studies costly verification in three different mechanism design settings to understand how it affects decision making and interacts with other tools, such as money burning, that can be used to enforce incentive compatibility.
520 $a In the first chapter, we study allocation in internal capital markets - a setting where the principal wishes to allocate a scarce resource among agents where the utility of the principal is the aggregated utility of the agents. We study the effects of money burning in internal capital markets in conjunction with costly verification and find that money burning can be part of the optimal strategy even in the presence of costly verification as a tool available to verify the agents' claims. This suggests that when the principal and the agent have aligned incentives, costly verification cannot entirely replace even the seemingly wasteful money burning as a tool to enforce truthfulness.
520 $a Next, we study the problem of an intermediary in a two sided market. A seller intends to sell an object of unknown quality with an uncertain demand, and one that is infinitely scalable at little or no cost -- such as digital content. The intermediary can inspect the quality of the seller's good at a cost. The buyers face certain liquidity constraints, and the sellers cannot be punished for making false claims of quality any more than non-payment. In this scenario we show that the optimal mechanism is one where the intermediary inspects the quality once the demand crosses a certain threshold. We also show that payment to the seller is made only in the states where an inspection is done; this comes from the fact that the seller cannot be punished for misrepresentation of quality, and thus cannot be paid in the event of no inspection. This setting provides us with an example of a situation where costly verification enables exchange when none would otherwise be possible.
520 $a Chapter three studies a bargaining problem in light of costly verification. Here, a seller aims to maximize the gains from sale of an indivisible object to a buyer - say when two firms are engaged in negotiations over a patent licensing agreement. The buyer's willingness to pay is her private information and can be verified by the seller at a cost. We show that in the optimal mechanism the interim probability of allocation, the payments and the probability of being allocated the object without verification are all monotone, suggesting that while costly verification can be used to implement any allocation rule, it does not affect the monotonicity in optimal mechanisms. We show that the seller allocates the object to the buyer with certainty if her type is higher than the cost of inspection; this does not however imply that all such types are inspected. Thus, this paper highlights a key difference that the settings with costly verification bear in contrast to the standard seller's problem - the guarantee of sale over a threshold. It thus hopes to provide insights into the problem with multiple sellers that will allow us to fully understand the role of costly verification in the classical mechanism design problem due to Myerson (1981).
590 $a School code: 0163.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
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