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The Economics of Collaborative Produ...

Sacks, Michael.

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The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies./
作者:	Sacks, Michael.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	191 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-12A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10124930
ISBN:	9781339830254

The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies.
Sacks, Michael.

The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 191 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2016.

The first chapter models the general mechanisms/tradeoffs underpinning the dynamics of collaborative production using a club theoretic framework and drawing on tools from differential game theory. Individuals with preferences that are far from the objective of the club may not immediately split and form a new club. Instead they may take advantage of the increasing returns from club membership and incubate their new club within an existing one. In equilibrium, clubs may not be able to prevent this type of behavior even if it is undesired. Moreover, there are a range of conditions under which clubs may encourage incubation of future competitors to take advantage of increasing returns themselves and build up their own capital base.

ISBN: 9781339830254Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
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520 $a The first chapter models the general mechanisms/tradeoffs underpinning the dynamics of collaborative production using a club theoretic framework and drawing on tools from differential game theory. Individuals with preferences that are far from the objective of the club may not immediately split and form a new club. Instead they may take advantage of the increasing returns from club membership and incubate their new club within an existing one. In equilibrium, clubs may not be able to prevent this type of behavior even if it is undesired. Moreover, there are a range of conditions under which clubs may encourage incubation of future competitors to take advantage of increasing returns themselves and build up their own capital base.
520 $a The second chapter abstracts away from the dynamics and focuses on the static trade-offs. Existing public and club good models assume monotonicity in the utility of both consumption and provision. A wide range of public and club goods violate these assumptions. Accounting for appropriate non-monotonicities dramatically alters the equilibrium structure and welfare. When the utility from consumption is no longer monotonic, increasing the number of contributors mitigates the free-rider problem, rather than exacerbating it. When both the consumption value and provision cost are non-monotonic, increasing the number of contributors not only mitigates the free-rider problem, but leads to an over-provision problem in which both the number of contributors and the intensity of contributions are inefficiently high. When the population is large, every equilibrium yields over-provision. Lastly welfare-maximizing policies involve transferring surpluses from consumers to producers.
520 $a The third chapter illustrates the competitive aspects of collaborative production in the context of the software industry. I address whether both proprietary and open source software will survive and how producers of proprietary software differentiate themselves from open source competition. I analyze competition between a firm producing proprietary software and a community producing open source software. If the firm faces no competition, then the software caters to less technologically savvy individuals. When facing competition, the open source software caters to the most technologically savvy individuals, leading the firm to target even less savvy individuals than it would when acting as a monopolist.
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