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Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Prob...

Farooque, Omar.

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Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Problems.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Problems./
作者:	Farooque, Omar.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-10A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10117176
ISBN:	9781339785790

Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Problems.
Farooque, Omar.

Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Problems. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 143 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2016.

This dissertation focuses on the multidimensional exchange and allocation in various market environments. These environments include auctions, two-sided matching environments, and networks.

ISBN: 9781339785790Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Multi-Unit Assignment Problems.
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520 $a This dissertation focuses on the multidimensional exchange and allocation in various market environments. These environments include auctions, two-sided matching environments, and networks.
520 $a In the first chapter we focus on the allocation of multiple heterogeneous goods. We study a setting in which a seller possesses several, heterogeneous goods for which they have zero value. The seller wishes to design a mechanism to allocate these goods in a constrained efficient manner to buyers who face budget-constraints. This work has applications to large, government run auctions such as FCC spectrum auctions, Department of Interior oil lease auctions, or US Forest Service run timber auctions. We develop two undominated mechanisms that satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility.
520 $a The second chapter studies the problem of two-sided matching markets with complementarities. We examine many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems in which one side of the market views the other as complements. In the many-to-one case, the side of the market which can be matched with multiple agents has preferences that satisfy a particular form of complementarity called ''cardinal-complementarity." Under cardinal complementarity, an agent wished to be matched with a another only if it also is being matched by some threshold number of other players which are viewed as complements. We demonstrate that stable matchings exist in both the many-to-one and many-to-many environments under cardinal complementarity and other suitable preference restrictions. To do so, we develop two strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithms that construct stable allocations.
520 $a Finally, we conclude by studying the problem of trading multiple, homogeneous goods in a network with intermediation. We focus on tri-partite networks, in which buyers, sellers, and intermediaries engage in multiple rounds of bilateral bargaining to facilitate the transfer of goods. We present a novel graph decomposition method that is used to partition buyers, sellers, and intermediaries into sub-types that reflect the local bargaining power they possess. We discuss an extension of the model in which the party in possession of the good may choose to sell the good to down-stream players with whom they are linked using second price auctions, rather than the benchmark bilateral bargaining protocol.
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