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Essays on Applied Economic Theory.

Zhao, Mofei.

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Essays on Applied Economic Theory.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Applied Economic Theory./
Author:	Zhao, Mofei.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
Description:	116 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-11A(E).
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10118916
ISBN:	9781339802336

Essays on Applied Economic Theory.
Zhao, Mofei.

Essays on Applied Economic Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 116 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2016.

The dissertation consists of three essays on applied theory with a particular focus on industrial organization applications.

ISBN: 9781339802336Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Applied Economic Theory.
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020 $a 9781339802336
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10118916
035 $a AAI10118916
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhao, Mofei. $3 3280667
245 1 0 $a Essays on Applied Economic Theory.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 116 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: John G. Riley; Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2016.
520 $a The dissertation consists of three essays on applied theory with a particular focus on industrial organization applications.
520 $a The first chapter develops and analyzes a dynamic stochastic model for a firm with limited managerial attention that is spent either on expansion or on improving quality of product. Under a reputational framework, I characterize how the incentives for expansion and innovation depend on a firm's current reputation, quality, and capacity. Intuitively, from the firm's perspective, quality and capacity are complements; the incentive to improve one increases with the level of the other. Thus, the firm innovates when its quality is low, reputation is low, and capacity is high; the firm expands when its quality is high, reputation is high, and capacity is low.
520 $a In the second chapter, I investigate several model variants of the reputational model proposed in Chapter 1. First, I introduce a non-trivial cost of innovation and expansion. I show that in equilibrium, the firm's optimal strategy takes an "innovate-shirk-expand" shape. In the second model variant, I replace the strong linearity assumption with increasing/decreasing returns to scale. Consequently, capacity becomes effective in the information structure. I show that, on each equilibrium path, the firm innovates when its quality is low, reputation is low, and capacity is high; it expands when its quality is high, reputation is high, and capacity is low. Finally, I generalize this model to a continuum of firms and study the steady-state distribution of reputation, quality, and capacity. Both computational and numerical results show that the bulk of low-reputation, low-quality firms lie at the bottom, while a few pioneers with high quality and high capacity are found at the top.
520 $a In the third chapter, I study the competition between two firms for a two-stage research and development project, where the difficulty of the first stage is unknown. I assume that each firm holds a belief concerning the difficulty of stage 1 and updates its belief following Bayes' rule. Firm can choose to report or withhold their intermediate results. I show that, as the exit point approaches, the firm has an incentive to conceal its success in the first stage, in the hope that its opponent raises its estimation of the stage's difficulty and soon exits. I demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium, characterize the firm's optimal strategy for report, withhold, and exit decisions, and investigate the resulting firm dynamics.
590 $a School code: 0031.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a University of California, Los Angeles. $b Economics 0246. $3 2093761
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-11A(E).
790 $a 0031
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10118916