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Essays on Labor Discipline.

Jaeckel, Johann K.

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Essays on Labor Discipline.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Labor Discipline./
Author:	Jaeckel, Johann K.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
Description:	92 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-11A(E).
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3711638
ISBN:	9781321879698

Essays on Labor Discipline.
Jaeckel, Johann K.

Essays on Labor Discipline. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 92 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2015.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

This dissertation collects three papers on endogenous effort enforcement and, thereby, extends the literature on efficiency wages and labor discipline. The first paper presents a baseline model of labor discipline based on contingent contract renewal and introduces idiosyncratic firm closure as an additional informational asymmetry. The paper argues that the effectiveness of the effort enforcement strategy is determined by the workers' expectation of future employment rents and the distribution of information about firm closure risk. Given certain conditions, excess investment in durable capital may serve as a signal to bring about an equilibrium separating firms with different closure risks. Starting from the same premise, the second paper investigates the relation between firm age and firm performance. Given that agents cannot credibly verify the idiosyncratic closure risk of a firm, but information about the previous lifespan of individual employers is public, workers estimate the future life expectancy of firms and adjust their effort response. The model predicts that, absent exogenous technical change, firms register continuous labor productivity growth as they age. This insight parallels the learning-by-doing hypothesis, but results from the strategic interaction between employers and employees. A comprehensive literature review on the treatment of the employment relationship in economic analysis is provided in the third chapter. The final paper pays specific attention to two similar but distinct models of endogenous effort enforcement and different strands of the Post-Walrasian theory of exchange.

ISBN: 9781321879698Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Labor Discipline.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on Labor Discipline.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2015
300 $a 92 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Duncan K. Foley.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2015.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a This dissertation collects three papers on endogenous effort enforcement and, thereby, extends the literature on efficiency wages and labor discipline. The first paper presents a baseline model of labor discipline based on contingent contract renewal and introduces idiosyncratic firm closure as an additional informational asymmetry. The paper argues that the effectiveness of the effort enforcement strategy is determined by the workers' expectation of future employment rents and the distribution of information about firm closure risk. Given certain conditions, excess investment in durable capital may serve as a signal to bring about an equilibrium separating firms with different closure risks. Starting from the same premise, the second paper investigates the relation between firm age and firm performance. Given that agents cannot credibly verify the idiosyncratic closure risk of a firm, but information about the previous lifespan of individual employers is public, workers estimate the future life expectancy of firms and adjust their effort response. The model predicts that, absent exogenous technical change, firms register continuous labor productivity growth as they age. This insight parallels the learning-by-doing hypothesis, but results from the strategic interaction between employers and employees. A comprehensive literature review on the treatment of the employment relationship in economic analysis is provided in the third chapter. The final paper pays specific attention to two similar but distinct models of endogenous effort enforcement and different strands of the Post-Walrasian theory of exchange.
590 $a School code: 1700.
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650 4 $a Labor economics. $3 642730
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