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COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION.

VIVES, F. XAVIER.

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COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION./
作者:	VIVES, F. XAVIER.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1983,
面頁冊數:	94 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 45-03, Section: A, page: 9080.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International45-03A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8413620

COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION.
VIVES, F. XAVIER.

COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1983 - 94 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 45-03, Section: A, page: 9080.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1983.

The present dissertation deals, in a partial equilibrium framework with strategic firms and price-taking consumers, with the following issues in oligopoly theory: (1) Technology flexibility and oligopoly outcomes, (2) Noncooperative deterrence of sequential entry in a Cournot world and (3) Differential properties of Cournot and Bertrand duopoly information equilibria.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION.
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245 1 0 $a COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION.
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300 $a 94 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 45-03, Section: A, page: 9080.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1983.
520 $a The present dissertation deals, in a partial equilibrium framework with strategic firms and price-taking consumers, with the following issues in oligopoly theory: (1) Technology flexibility and oligopoly outcomes, (2) Noncooperative deterrence of sequential entry in a Cournot world and (3) Differential properties of Cournot and Bertrand duopoly information equilibria.
520 $a Chapter I presents two oligopoly models, parametrized by the degree of flexibility of the technology and where firms choose the optimal scale of production (capacity) first and then a competitive stage follows. It is shown in both models that in (Nash) equilibrium as one moves from nonflexible to flexible technologies the resulting price ranges from the Cournot price to the Bertrand price. Furthermore in one of the models we show that the speed of convergence to the efficient outcome as the number of firms grows is faster the more flexible is the technology.
520 $a Chapter II, which includes joint work with Richard Gilbert, considers an industry with m incumbent firms and n potential entrants which must enter sequentially. Restricting attention to subgame perfect equilibria it is shown that, except for blockaded entry, if the entry cost, F, is large entry is prevented and typically there is a continuum of entry preventing equilibria. If it is small entry of all potential entrants is allowed. For intermediate values of F both types of equilibria exist and the entry equilibrium dominates in profit terms the others. Total output is monotone nondecreasing in n but not necessarily in m unless attention is restricted to undominated equilibria.
520 $a A duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand is studied in Chapter III. It is shown that if the goods are substitutes (not) to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Bertrand (Cournot) competition. If the goods are complement the result is reversed. Furthermore: (i) With substitutes in Cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in Bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes. With complements the market outcome is always optimal. (ii) Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition and (iii) the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in Cournot and negative in Bertrand competition.
590 $a School code: 0028.
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790 $a 0028
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1983
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8413620