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Redesigning democracy = more ideas f...

Gersbach, Hans.

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Redesigning democracy = more ideas for better rules /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Redesigning democracy/ by Hans Gersbach.
Reminder of title:	more ideas for better rules /
Author:	Gersbach, Hans.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2017.,
Description:	xii, 248 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	Part I: Contractual Democracy -- Retrospect -- Vote-share Contracts without Signaling of Competence -- Vote Thresholds with Signaling of Competence -- Information Markets, Elections and Threshold Contracts -- Limits of Contractual Democracy -- Part II: Rules for Decision-making and Agenda-setting -- Democratic Provision of Divisible Public Goods -- Minority Voting and Public Project Provision -- Initiative-group Constitutions -- Perspectives.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Democracy - Mathematical models. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53405-3
ISBN:	9783319534053

Redesigning democracy = more ideas for better rules /
Gersbach, Hans.

Redesigning democracymore ideas for better rules /[electronic resource] :by Hans Gersbach. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - xii, 248 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Part I: Contractual Democracy -- Retrospect -- Vote-share Contracts without Signaling of Competence -- Vote Thresholds with Signaling of Competence -- Information Markets, Elections and Threshold Contracts -- Limits of Contractual Democracy -- Part II: Rules for Decision-making and Agenda-setting -- Democratic Provision of Divisible Public Goods -- Minority Voting and Public Project Provision -- Initiative-group Constitutions -- Perspectives.

Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author's successful book "Designing Democracy" from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. "We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we have done it." This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA.

ISBN: 9783319534053

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-53405-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

741732
Democracy
--Mathematical models.

LC Class. No.: JC423 / .G47 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 321.80151

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100 1 $a Gersbach, Hans. $3 895716
245 1 0 $a Redesigning democracy $h [electronic resource] : $b more ideas for better rules / $c by Hans Gersbach.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2017.
300 $a xii, 248 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
505 0 $a Part I: Contractual Democracy -- Retrospect -- Vote-share Contracts without Signaling of Competence -- Vote Thresholds with Signaling of Competence -- Information Markets, Elections and Threshold Contracts -- Limits of Contractual Democracy -- Part II: Rules for Decision-making and Agenda-setting -- Democratic Provision of Divisible Public Goods -- Minority Voting and Public Project Provision -- Initiative-group Constitutions -- Perspectives.
520 $a Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author's successful book "Designing Democracy" from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. "We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we have done it." This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA.
650 0 $a Democracy $x Mathematical models. $3 741732
650 0 $a Elections. $3 723102
650 1 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 2 4 $a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice. $3 2182335
650 2 4 $a Democracy. $3 519163
650 2 4 $a Public Economics. $3 2162304
650 2 4 $a Political Economy. $3 2054328
650 2 4 $a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. $3 2162305
650 2 4 $a Law and Economics. $3 891054
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 836513
773 0 $t Springer eBooks
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53405-3
950 $a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)