東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on Risk Management for Insura...

Ping, Xiaohu.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies./
作者:	Ping, Xiaohu.
面頁冊數:	89 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-12A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3718131
ISBN:	9781321978728

Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies.
Ping, Xiaohu.

Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies. - 89 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia State University, 2015.

The dissertation includes two essays on insurer's risk management. The first essay is about how insurers use contract structure to manage their underwriting risks. Existing research on insurance contract theory emphasizes information problems and demand side issues when explaining contract structure. Supply-side factors, especially risk considerations at the insurer, have received much less attention. In this paper, we extend the optimal contracting framework of Raviv, 1979 to explore how background risk at the insurer affects optimal contract structure. We confirm earlier findings that insurer background risk may reduce risk sharing in the optimal contract. We go further to show that positive correlation between the insurer's background risk and the insured's loss can yield contract forms ruled out by the standard model, such as upper limits on coverage, and explain patterns of risk sharing not addressed in the literature, such as large deductibles in catastrophe contracts.

ISBN: 9781321978728Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies.
LDR:02811nmm a2200301 4500 001 2078174
005 20161122113935.5
008 170521s2015 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781321978728
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3718131
035 $a AAI3718131
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Ping, Xiaohu. $3 3193743
245 1 0 $a Essays on Risk Management for Insurance Companies.
300 $a 89 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: George Zanjani.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia State University, 2015.
520 $a The dissertation includes two essays on insurer's risk management. The first essay is about how insurers use contract structure to manage their underwriting risks. Existing research on insurance contract theory emphasizes information problems and demand side issues when explaining contract structure. Supply-side factors, especially risk considerations at the insurer, have received much less attention. In this paper, we extend the optimal contracting framework of Raviv, 1979 to explore how background risk at the insurer affects optimal contract structure. We confirm earlier findings that insurer background risk may reduce risk sharing in the optimal contract. We go further to show that positive correlation between the insurer's background risk and the insured's loss can yield contract forms ruled out by the standard model, such as upper limits on coverage, and explain patterns of risk sharing not addressed in the literature, such as large deductibles in catastrophe contracts.
520 $a The second essay studies the capital allocation rule in a general portfolio optimization problem with irreversible investments. I find that marginal cost pricing can still be connected to capital allocation in this setup, although the basis for allocation is different from that found in static problems. The investment decision for an opportunity presented today is made on the basis of an expected future marginal cost of risk associated with that opportunity. The capital allocated for today's opportunity is a probability-weighted average of the product of the marginal value of capital in future states of the world and the amount of capital consumed by today's opportunity in those future states. In addition, our numerical examples show that failure to explicitly model uncertainties regarding future opportunities can lead to understatement of the marginal cost of risk, and, as a result, over-investment in current opportunities.
590 $a School code: 0079.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a Georgia State University. $b Risk Management and Insurance. $3 2095927
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-12A(E).
790 $a 0079
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3718131