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Ways of appearing: Experience and it...

Vuletic, Milos.

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Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology./
Author:	Vuletic, Milos.
Description:	146 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-02A(E).
Subject:	Epistemology. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3725603
ISBN:	9781339099590

Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology.
Vuletic, Milos.

Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology. - 146 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2015.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Perceptual experience is an invaluable guide to our cognition of the world: (i) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects possible, and (ii) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects reasonable. My dissertation aims to answer the question: how should we account for experience if we are to do justice to its rational role in cognition? I argue that neither of the two dominant contemporary models of experience is satisfactory: experience as representation and experience as acquaintance. Experience should be understood as a matter of various items being present to the experiencing subject. Crucially, I propose an account of perceptual error in terms of the presence of unreal senseimages (in hallucination) and presentational tropes (in illusion).

ISBN: 9781339099590Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology.
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020 $a 9781339099590
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040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Vuletic, Milos. $3 3193573
245 1 0 $a Ways of appearing: Experience and its phenomenology.
300 $a 146 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Anil Gupta.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2015.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a Perceptual experience is an invaluable guide to our cognition of the world: (i) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects possible, and (ii) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects reasonable. My dissertation aims to answer the question: how should we account for experience if we are to do justice to its rational role in cognition? I argue that neither of the two dominant contemporary models of experience is satisfactory: experience as representation and experience as acquaintance. Experience should be understood as a matter of various items being present to the experiencing subject. Crucially, I propose an account of perceptual error in terms of the presence of unreal senseimages (in hallucination) and presentational tropes (in illusion).
520 $a First I argue against treating experience as a representational state. I show that such treatments require a strong relation to obtain between experience and content; I argue that the strong relation cannot be sustained. I show, in particular, that experience is not best understood as a state in which properties are attributed to objects or in which concepts are employed. Experience should instead be treated as a matter of a relation of subjects to objects and their properties.
520 $a Next, I argue against the acquaintance-based relational approaches to experience. These accounts do not treat illusion plausibly; they cannot sustain two basic facts: that an object can exhibit different appearances and that different objects can exhibit identical appearances. In response to this problem I posit a weaker perceptual relation: in experience certain items are present to the subject. Presence does not entail knowledge of items present.
520 $a Finally, I offer an improved relationalist approach to perceptual error. I endorse the idea that in hallucination there are items---unreal sense-images---present to the subject. However, I reject the proposal to treat illusions in the same way: presence of sense-images in illusion makes the presence of misperceived objects redundant. Instead, I propose that presentational tropes are present in illusion. Presentational tropes are relational particulars that require both a subject and an experienced object for their existence.
590 $a School code: 0178.
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0393
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a University of Pittsburgh. $3 958527
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-02A(E).
790 $a 0178
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3725603