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Essays in microeconomic theory.

Phan, William Nguyen.

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Essays in microeconomic theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in microeconomic theory./
作者:	Phan, William Nguyen.
面頁冊數:	156 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-02A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3731670
ISBN:	9781339180861

Essays in microeconomic theory.
Phan, William Nguyen.

Essays in microeconomic theory. - 156 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2015.

In Chapter 1, I consider the problem of coordinating the exchange of real-time information among agents. For example, a US Department of Transportation pilot program seeks to reduce traffic accidents by allowing each vehicle to request and send crash-relevant information (e.g. position, speed, braking status) from and to neighboring vehicles. Time is of the essence: vehicle information becomes stale quickly. Electronic files, the medium of information, are corrupt/useless when partial, hence I model them as indivisible resources (objects). Each agent may perfectly replicate an object in his possession and transfer it to another agent. However, replication and transfer takes time (e.g. due to bandwidth constraints), and scarcity arises due to fact that information quickly becomes valueless. How should agents transfer such objects? I identify a rule that satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness, and a new axiom based on the concept of reciprocity. I also consider more general environments e.g. when agents live in a network.

ISBN: 9781339180861Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in microeconomic theory.
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100 1 $a Phan, William Nguyen. $3 3191053
245 1 0 $a Essays in microeconomic theory.
300 $a 156 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: William Thomson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2015.
520 $a In Chapter 1, I consider the problem of coordinating the exchange of real-time information among agents. For example, a US Department of Transportation pilot program seeks to reduce traffic accidents by allowing each vehicle to request and send crash-relevant information (e.g. position, speed, braking status) from and to neighboring vehicles. Time is of the essence: vehicle information becomes stale quickly. Electronic files, the medium of information, are corrupt/useless when partial, hence I model them as indivisible resources (objects). Each agent may perfectly replicate an object in his possession and transfer it to another agent. However, replication and transfer takes time (e.g. due to bandwidth constraints), and scarcity arises due to fact that information quickly becomes valueless. How should agents transfer such objects? I identify a rule that satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness, and a new axiom based on the concept of reciprocity. I also consider more general environments e.g. when agents live in a network.
520 $a In Chapter 2, for the same problem, I consider probabilistic allocation rules and focus on fairness by proposing several criteria based on the concepts of reciprocity, no-envy, and equal treatment. For example, if Alice helps Bob, and Bob helps Sarah, then it is natural to suggest that Sarah should help Alice (if Alice so desires)---reciprocity along paths. The main result is the existence of a rule satisfying the three fairness properties in addition to efficiency.
520 $a In Chapter 3, we study the object re-allocation problem where each agent is endowed with one object, and a social authority wishes to reshuffle (possibly probabilistically) these objects amongst the agents. We propose the partial-endowment lower bound: a parameterized family which weakens the endowment lower bound (also known as individual rationality). The property requires that for each agent, his assignment dominates the one in which he receives his own object with some probability, and a null object with the remaining probability. If for each agent, this probability is 1, then we have the standard object re-allocation problem; 0, the standard object allocation problem. We consider probabilistic rules that are convex combinations of efficient and group strategy-proof rules. Our first result characterizes rules that satisfy efficiency, the partial-endowment lower bound, and are mixtures of Serial Priority rules. Next, we show that efficiency and the partial-endowment lower bound characterize Gale's Top Trading Cycles.
590 $a School code: 0188.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
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690 $a 0501
710 2 $a University of Rochester. $b School of Arts and Sciences. $3 2099014
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-02A(E).
790 $a 0188
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3731670