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Three Essays on Financial Economics.

Zhou, Dexin.

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Three Essays on Financial Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three Essays on Financial Economics./
作者:	Zhou, Dexin.
面頁冊數:	138 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3709039
ISBN:	9781321844986

Three Essays on Financial Economics.
Zhou, Dexin.

Three Essays on Financial Economics. - 138 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2015.

This dissertation examines the role of qualitative information in financial markets. Using textual analysis methodologies, I quantify the qualitative information in news media and corporate disclosures. The first essay (The Blame Game) examines the information in corporate executives' self-serving attribution behaviors. Using textual analysis, I construct a measure that identifies corporate executives' behaviors of blaming external factors such as economy or the industry. I find that the patterns of the blame behaviors are consistent with self-serving attribution bias. I also find that a high blame measure leads to low subsequent stock returns and low turnover-performance sensitivity. Blame behaviors also predicts negative earnings surprise and analyst downgrades. Further tests show that these results are robust after controlling for exposure to systematic risk factors. These results support the idea that investors underreact to firm-specific negative information when corporate executives blame external factors. The second essay (Analysts' Assimilation of Soft Information in the Financial Press), coauthored with Xue Wang and Mark Bradshaw, investigates the role of analyst in interpreting soft news from news media. We find that the quantity of news coverage of a firm is positively associated with subsequent analyst recommendation revision activity. Moreover, the recommendation revisions are more informative for firms with more intense news coverage. We also find that this relationship is mainly driven by soft news (news with low fraction of numeric information). These results shed new light on the source analysts' mosaic of information and the role of analysts. The third essay examines managers' (Good News in Numbers) use of numbers versus words in the conference call disclosure. I find that executives tend to use numbers when companies experience satisfactory performance and use words when they have to disclose poor performance. In addition, the ratio of numbers and words contains value-relevant information about the company. Market reacts positively when corporate executives use high fraction of numbers. However, the initial market reaction is incomplete. The stock prices continue to outperform in one quarter following the conference call when corporate executives use more numeric information in the conference calls.

ISBN: 9781321844986Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Three Essays on Financial Economics.
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