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The effect of shareholder rights and...

Golden, Nan.

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The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity./
作者:	Golden, Nan.
面頁冊數:	102 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-08A(E).
標題:	Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10095874
ISBN:	9781339600505

The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity.
Golden, Nan.

The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity. - 102 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-08(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015.

I investigate the effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity. Prior research shows that the dilution effect of the exercise of the employee stock options on earnings per share (EPS) decreases the value of stock options. Thus, managers tend to use stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders (the dividend substitution effect). I document that the executive stock option incentives to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends are stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and the level of information asymmetry positively influences managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock. Furthermore, prior research indicates that information asymmetry is positively associated with stock repurchases. I also provide evidence indicating that the relationship between information asymmetry and stock repurchases is stronger when firms have weaker shareholder rights. My study fills a gap in research on dividend substitution research, suggesting that managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock depend on shareholder rights and information asymmetry. Furthermore, I extend the analysis of information asymmetry in payout policy by exploring the degree in which the strength of shareholder rights influences this effect.

ISBN: 9781339600505Subjects--Topical Terms:

557516
Accounting.

The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015.
520 $a I investigate the effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity. Prior research shows that the dilution effect of the exercise of the employee stock options on earnings per share (EPS) decreases the value of stock options. Thus, managers tend to use stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders (the dividend substitution effect). I document that the executive stock option incentives to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends are stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and the level of information asymmetry positively influences managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock. Furthermore, prior research indicates that information asymmetry is positively associated with stock repurchases. I also provide evidence indicating that the relationship between information asymmetry and stock repurchases is stronger when firms have weaker shareholder rights. My study fills a gap in research on dividend substitution research, suggesting that managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock depend on shareholder rights and information asymmetry. Furthermore, I extend the analysis of information asymmetry in payout policy by exploring the degree in which the strength of shareholder rights influences this effect.
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