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Essays on contracting problems.

Lin, Hsuan-Chih Luke.

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Essays on contracting problems.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on contracting problems./
作者:	Lin, Hsuan-Chih Luke.
面頁冊數:	133 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3704277
ISBN:	9781321765694

Essays on contracting problems.
Lin, Hsuan-Chih Luke.

Essays on contracting problems. - 133 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2015.

This thesis contains three chapters regarding applications of contracting problems to different topics. The first chapter studies the optimal joint design of disability insurance and unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard, when health status is private information, and cyclical fluctuations. I show how disability benefits and unemployment benefits vary with aggregate economic conditions in an optimal contract. I then consider a calibrated version of the full model and study the quantitative implications of both the current system and the optimal system. In the optimal system, disability benefits are designed such that the system punishes workers who stay unemployed for a long time. Finally, I consider the welfare impact of changing from the current system to the optimal one when both systems provide the same ex-ante utility to the worker. The cost savings incurred from handling the incentive problems are substantial, ranging from 45 percent to 101 percent for different workers, and the unemployment rate could be reduced by roughly 50 percent.

ISBN: 9781321765694Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

Essays on contracting problems.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Noah Williams.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2015.
520 $a This thesis contains three chapters regarding applications of contracting problems to different topics. The first chapter studies the optimal joint design of disability insurance and unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard, when health status is private information, and cyclical fluctuations. I show how disability benefits and unemployment benefits vary with aggregate economic conditions in an optimal contract. I then consider a calibrated version of the full model and study the quantitative implications of both the current system and the optimal system. In the optimal system, disability benefits are designed such that the system punishes workers who stay unemployed for a long time. Finally, I consider the welfare impact of changing from the current system to the optimal one when both systems provide the same ex-ante utility to the worker. The cost savings incurred from handling the incentive problems are substantial, ranging from 45 percent to 101 percent for different workers, and the unemployment rate could be reduced by roughly 50 percent.
520 $a The second chapter is about non-stationary two-sided learning in continuous time. This paper studies the multi-period contracting problem when actions of an agent are unobservable and both parties disagree on the agent's ability. The question being asked is how the actions would be affected when the amount of disagreement is another motivating factor. I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility of contracts. I then use results from stochastic analysis to transform the problem into one that can be solved numerically using Monte Carlo simulations. My results exhibit an interesting pattern: effort is no longer front-loaded as in the related work of Prat and Jovanovic (2013), and responses to incentives are significant when the terminal date approaches.
520 $a The third chapter discusses anti-dumping duties and money burning. I show that with delegated decisions and private information, optimal trade agreements could consist of tariff caps as well as burning money before high tariff sanctions are used.
590 $a School code: 0262.
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