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The effect of punishing "over-contri...

Biesanz, Zachary W.

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The effect of punishing "over-contributors" on overall welfare: Some experimental evidence.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The effect of punishing "over-contributors" on overall welfare: Some experimental evidence./
作者:	Biesanz, Zachary W.
面頁冊數:	77 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 55-02.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International55-02(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1601498
ISBN:	9781339132280

The effect of punishing "over-contributors" on overall welfare: Some experimental evidence.
Biesanz, Zachary W.

The effect of punishing "over-contributors" on overall welfare: Some experimental evidence. - 77 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 55-02.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Minnesota, 2015.

A public goods environment was constructed to simulate a dilemma in which corporate managers choose between acts of corporate social responsibility and acts of profitability. An experiment was conducted to determine the effect of a penalty for contributing above a specific level. The penalty has significant effects, encouraging free riding and suppressing contributions at all levels, even though most contributions would not have triggered the penalty.

ISBN: 9781339132280Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

The effect of punishing "over-contributors" on overall welfare: Some experimental evidence.
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