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Essays on competition in the pharmac...

Wan, Jiangyun.

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Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry./
作者:	Wan, Jiangyun.
面頁冊數:	97 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-01A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3721575
ISBN:	9781339032108

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
Wan, Jiangyun.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry. - 97 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida International University, 2015.

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare.

ISBN: 9781339032108Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
300 $a 97 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Kaz Miyagiwa.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida International University, 2015.
520 $a Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare.
520 $a Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support.
520 $a Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.
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650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
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710 2 $a Florida International University. $b Economics. $3 2097279
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