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The political economy of special eco...

Moberg, Lotta.

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The political economy of special economic zones.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The political economy of special economic zones./
作者:	Moberg, Lotta.
面頁冊數:	139 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3706648
ISBN:	9781321806922

The political economy of special economic zones.
Moberg, Lotta.

The political economy of special economic zones. - 139 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2015.

Special economic zones (SEZs) are a wide-spread and increasingly popular tool for economic growth. Big or small, secluded or isolated, they are areas where a government allows for different rules to apply than the rest of the country. Most commonly, this means granting fiscal privileges to investors in the zones. Exemptions from taxes, tariffs, and sometimes regulations mean that SEZs form islands of economic liberalization in a country. A common attitude to zones is therefore that while broader liberalization is preferred, SEZs always benefit a country as long as they bring about this marginal improvement. The skeptical view of SEZs is that their geographically limited reach means that they are always somewhat misguided. If SEZs bring good policies, their geographical limitation only implies that these are underprovided.

ISBN: 9781321806922Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

The political economy of special economic zones.
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100 1 $a Moberg, Lotta. $3 3185443
245 1 4 $a The political economy of special economic zones.
300 $a 139 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Tyler Cowen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2015.
520 $a Special economic zones (SEZs) are a wide-spread and increasingly popular tool for economic growth. Big or small, secluded or isolated, they are areas where a government allows for different rules to apply than the rest of the country. Most commonly, this means granting fiscal privileges to investors in the zones. Exemptions from taxes, tariffs, and sometimes regulations mean that SEZs form islands of economic liberalization in a country. A common attitude to zones is therefore that while broader liberalization is preferred, SEZs always benefit a country as long as they bring about this marginal improvement. The skeptical view of SEZs is that their geographically limited reach means that they are always somewhat misguided. If SEZs bring good policies, their geographical limitation only implies that these are underprovided.
520 $a This dissertation is an attempt to understand and adjudicate between these positions, and examine when the skepticism is more warranted than the praise. I take account of the political economy of SEZs to explore why they come about, and how different conditions can make them both damaging and highly beneficial for an economy.
520 $a The first chapter gives an overview of the dissertation. The second chapter analyzes whether SEZs are better or worse than the status quo. Everything else being equal, does introducing SEZs have a positive effect on an economy? There are several problems with SEZs that may outweigh their benefits. They do not come for free, and governments often pay for much of the necessary infrastructure. Governments may also determine the zone's location and nature of production. If these choices are misguided, the zones become a bigger cost than a benefit to the country's tax payers. SEZs may also be a way for corrupt policy makers and bureaucrats to extract bribes from zone investors, or to give out procurement contracts to their peers. This abuse of SEZs can make them more of a burden than a benefit for an economy. Under the right institutions and zone policies, however, SEZs can indeed benefit an economy. I argue that democratic systems, political decentralization, and zone privatization are vital contributors to SEZ success.
520 $a In the third chapter, I assume that these problems have been dealt with, to examine SEZs from another skeptical angle. Zones can be tools for rent-seeking in a less obvious way than graft, namely as a way to preserve protectionism. If SEZs are used to avoid broader reforms in a country's trade regime, they cannot be seen as beneficial, even if they improve on the status quo. We must therefore compare SEZs with their politically plausible alternative. To illustrate this notion, I use a model of endogenous tariff formation, where the government sets tariff rates in response to the lobbying of interest groups that are either for or against protectionism. If this rent-seeking scheme is threatened, the government can introduce SEZs as a second-best solution to preserve some of its rents. In light of the model, I discuss the benefits of SEZs compared to their political alternatives. SEZs are in fact not beneficial if the government would otherwise be induced or forced to introduce broader economic reforms. They only benefit a country when the political alternative is more protectionism. I use a case study of the Dominican Republic to exemplify how SEZs can come about as a rent-seeking scheme. I also discuss how SEZ incentives to import prevent them from becoming locomotives for economic growth.
520 $a The fourth chapter revisits the problem with governments either being misguided or driven by corrupt motives when introducing SEZs. Although they are a suboptimal way to expand exports and boost development, the motives behind SEZs will be very different if local interests pursue them with the aim to expand economic activity in their area. In such cases, SEZs may not only benefit a country, but even lead to broader economic reforms. Elites with interests in economic liberalization can use SEZs to bring about reforms gradually, when a majority of the government elite opposes reform. For this to happen, the country must be decentralized, so that pro-reform minorities have the incentives to introduce SEZs and ability to find the right SEZ policies. Once introduced, SEZs make economic liberalization a lucrative option for more elite members, resulting in more SEZs and eventually countrywide economic liberalization. Comparative case studies of China and Ghana illustrates these points.
520 $a The last chapter provides some concluding remarks. In all, this dissertation brings new unique perspectives on SEZs. Because of the current ubiquity of SEZs in the world, they also contribute to our understanding of the broader fields of trade policy, rent-seeking, and decentralization. I hope that my work provides informative and though provoking reading.
590 $a School code: 0883.
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791 $a Ph.D.
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