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A valuation model for two-stage cont...

Amaeshi, Nnaemeka U.

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A valuation model for two-stage contract negotiations over multiple interdependent issues.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A valuation model for two-stage contract negotiations over multiple interdependent issues./
作者:	Amaeshi, Nnaemeka U.
面頁冊數:	92 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 55-01.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International55-01(E).
標題:	Systems science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1600676
ISBN:	9781339101163

A valuation model for two-stage contract negotiations over multiple interdependent issues.
Amaeshi, Nnaemeka U.

A valuation model for two-stage contract negotiations over multiple interdependent issues. - 92 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 55-01.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri University of Science and Technology, 2015.

Most real-world negotiation scenarios involve multiple interdependent issues over which the negotiating parties will seek an agreement. Simultaneous negotiation over multiple interdependent issues is an especially challenging problem because utility functions of negotiating agents are typically nonlinear and difficult to analyze. Also, negotiations often happen under circumstances of incomplete information, where either party has either little or inaccurate information about the preferences or utilities of the other party. Consequently, negotiations may go over multiple rounds until a mutually acceptable agreement is reached. The objective of this research is to create a quantitative model of decision-making that helps one negotiating party (e.g., the supplier) derive efficient solutions in negotiation. This thesis defines conflicts in negotiation and, accordingly, models the marginal probability of negotiation outcomes on each conflict for the supplier. A probability coupling approach is developed to determine the joint probability distribution of negotiation outcomes. In order to analyze a negotiation over two stages, this thesis formulates a Dynamic Programming (DP) problem to determine the optimal decision for the supplier at each stage of the negotiation. In the DP problem the supplier seeks the best trade-off between the monetary reward of the contract and the successful chance in the negotiation. The valuation model helps the supplier determine a sequentially chained negotiation strategy in an effective and efficient manner. With the model practitioners may gain a scientific understanding of negotiation decision analysis.

ISBN: 9781339101163Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168411
Systems science.

A valuation model for two-stage contract negotiations over multiple interdependent issues.
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