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Essays on Information and Debt.

Hebert, Benjamin Michael.

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Essays on Information and Debt.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information and Debt./
作者:	Hebert, Benjamin Michael.
面頁冊數:	247 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-04A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3738803
ISBN:	9781339293028

Essays on Information and Debt.
Hebert, Benjamin Michael.

Essays on Information and Debt. - 247 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2015.

These essays attempt to explain why debt contracts are so common, and to explore the consequences resulting from the use of debt contracts. In the first essay, "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," I use tools from information theory to study a novel form of moral hazard, and show that debt contracts are the optimal security design in this setting. In the second essay, "Generalized Rational Inattention," written with Michael Woodford, we develop a generalized version of rational inattention, based on an axiomatic characterization, using the same theorems employed in the first essay. In the third essay, "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," written with Jesse Schreger, we estimate the costs that Argentina's 2014 sovereign default imposed on Argentine firms.

ISBN: 9781339293028Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Essays on Information and Debt.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Emmanuel Farhi; David Laibson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2015.
520 $a These essays attempt to explain why debt contracts are so common, and to explore the consequences resulting from the use of debt contracts. In the first essay, "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," I use tools from information theory to study a novel form of moral hazard, and show that debt contracts are the optimal security design in this setting. In the second essay, "Generalized Rational Inattention," written with Michael Woodford, we develop a generalized version of rational inattention, based on an axiomatic characterization, using the same theorems employed in the first essay. In the third essay, "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," written with Jesse Schreger, we estimate the costs that Argentina's 2014 sovereign default imposed on Argentine firms.
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650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
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710 2 $a Harvard University. $b Business Economics. $3 2093772
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