東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays in Microeconomic Theory and B...

Mezhvinsky, Dimitry.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics./
作者:	Mezhvinsky, Dimitry.
面頁冊數:	221 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-11A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3710307
ISBN:	9781321861655

Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics.
Mezhvinsky, Dimitry.

Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics. - 221 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2015.

Classical economic models of individual and firm behavior provide valuable insights into how rational agents make decisions. However, highly generalized models, by design, omit factors that may be relevant to particular markets. Such omissions may lead to inaccurate predictions of behavior in the real world. In this dissertation, I examine three distinct settings in which the omission of relevant beliefs, preferences, and outside options may prevent traditional models from fully capturing rational decision making.

ISBN: 9781321861655Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics.
LDR:04120nmm a2200313 4500 001 2067490
005 20160411144743.5
008 170521s2015 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781321861655
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3710307
035 $a AAI3710307
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Mezhvinsky, Dimitry. $3 3182341
245 1 0 $a Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics.
300 $a 221 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: John Kagel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2015.
520 $a Classical economic models of individual and firm behavior provide valuable insights into how rational agents make decisions. However, highly generalized models, by design, omit factors that may be relevant to particular markets. Such omissions may lead to inaccurate predictions of behavior in the real world. In this dissertation, I examine three distinct settings in which the omission of relevant beliefs, preferences, and outside options may prevent traditional models from fully capturing rational decision making.
520 $a In Chapter 1, I examine why the logic of backward induction and iterated elimination of dominated strategies fail as predictors of behavior in the centipede game and similar games. I elicit players' beliefs about other players' strategies in a normal form centipede game to gain insight into players' decision making process. The experimental evidence reveals that players have heterogeneous starting beliefs about how others will play the game, which they gradually update based on past experience, leading to changes in players' chosen actions over multiple plays of the game. Players take past experience as a signal of how future opponents will play the game but anticipate that other participants may also change how they play the game as the experimental session progresses. Beliefs better predict changes in player choices than players' past experience, alone, and the pattern of belief evolution is in keeping with the convergence toward the classical theoretic prediction observed in other studies. Additionally, individuals correctly anticipate that a population of players begins the game by playing cooperatively but gradually transitions to a strategy of expected payoff maximization. These findings suggest that players' starting beliefs about others and players' experience in playing the game serve an important role in determining the evolution of strategies over multiple plays of the game.
520 $a In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that buyers engage in boycotting and "boycotting" in order to respectively punish and reward a seller's policies of which they are neither the victim nor the beneficiary. Notably, the experimental results show that third-party punishment and reward occurs even when the mechanism for executing such punishment and reward is not straightforward and when no punishment (reward) may be viewed as the neutral or default choice. This paper also finds that the average buyer does not condition her boycotting and buycotting decisions on the actions of other buyers in this setting.
520 $a In Chapter 3, I explore a setting featuring two simultaneous, private value eBay-style auctions for heterogeneous goods, in order to explain the prevalence of multiple, unique bidding strategies in eBay auctions. I find that multiple broad strategies of bidding may be supported as equilibrium strategies when goods are horizontally differentiated. I also demonstrate that eBay-style auctions may yield greater social efficiency than second-price sealed-bid auctions, under certain assumptions. Furthermore, I demonstrate that, when bidding costs are sufficiently high, the eBay auction mechanism may not yield efficient outcomes for either horizontally or vertically differentiated goods.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Behavioral psychology. $3 2122788
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0384
710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Economics. $3 1673045
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-11A(E).
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3710307