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Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipie...

Jolliff, Brandy J.

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Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Foreign Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995-2013.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Foreign Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995-2013./
作者:	Jolliff, Brandy J.
面頁冊數:	161 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3704728
ISBN:	9781321773262

Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Foreign Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995-2013.
Jolliff, Brandy J.

Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Foreign Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995-2013. - 161 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2015.

What explains the emergence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as recipients of foreign aid? I argue that foreign aid provision to IGOs is a significant development in the foreign policy of the European Union and explain this phenomenon by modifying the traditional donor interest versus recipient need framework for understanding aid allocations, where aid giving to IGOs, rather than states, is a new tool of aid allocation for the purpose of recipient need rather than the pursuit of donor interests. Using original data on European Commission foreign aid allocations to PTAs from 1995-2013, I test the argument that EU aid allocations are primarily determined by economic and trade development considerations and present three key propositions, where a) foreign aid allocations from the EU will be larger when aid is allocated to PTAs with greater economic and trade development need; b) aid allocations from the EU are not driven primarily by donor interest considerations; and c) aid allocations from the EU will be greater when allocated to PTAs with a high degree of institutional independence from member states, indicating a depoliticized aid environment. Using quantitative analysis, I find considerable support for these propositions and supplement the statistical findings with qualitative case research based upon elite-level interviews of European Commission officials. I show that indeed, when the European Union provides aid to PTAs, they give aid predominantly to more needy, independent PTAs, not to further their own interests as an aid donor.

ISBN: 9781321773262Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Explaining A New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Foreign Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995-2013.
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