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Three essays in executive compensation.

Beavers, Randy Earl.

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Three essays in executive compensation.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays in executive compensation./
作者:	Beavers, Randy Earl.
面頁冊數:	167 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-11A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3711455
ISBN:	9781321876857

Three essays in executive compensation.
Beavers, Randy Earl.

Three essays in executive compensation. - 167 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Alabama, 2015.

In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO.

ISBN: 9781321876857Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Three essays in executive compensation.
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520 $a In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO.
520 $a In essay two, I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M&A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders.
520 $a In essay three, I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate compensation incentives of risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage. These types of firms use a higher percentage of term loans and other debt but a lower percentage of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.
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