東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays in Theory and Industrial Orga...

Temnyalov, Emil M.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization./
作者:	Temnyalov, Emil M.
面頁冊數:	166 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3705378
ISBN:	9781321783155

Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization.
Temnyalov, Emil M.

Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization. - 166 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.

This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of industrial organization, with a focus on competition and pricing by firms. Chapters 1 and 2 study rewards and loyalty schemes (such as frequent flyer programs) from a contract theoretic perspective, in a monopoly and a duopoly setting, respectively. Chapter 3 studies another form of non-price competition: the race to develop and patent new inventions. In all three chapters I focus on the question of how a firm's ability to create and capture surplus is shaped by different modes of competition, such as the ability to attract customers through rewards programs or the ability to patent inventions and enforce intellectual property rights.

ISBN: 9781321783155Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization.
LDR:04953nmm a2200313 4500 001 2065354
005 20151130143857.5
008 170521s2015 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781321783155
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3705378
035 $a AAI3705378
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Temnyalov, Emil M. $3 3180042
245 1 0 $a Essays in Theory and Industrial Organization.
300 $a 166 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Jeffrey Ely.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of industrial organization, with a focus on competition and pricing by firms. Chapters 1 and 2 study rewards and loyalty schemes (such as frequent flyer programs) from a contract theoretic perspective, in a monopoly and a duopoly setting, respectively. Chapter 3 studies another form of non-price competition: the race to develop and patent new inventions. In all three chapters I focus on the question of how a firm's ability to create and capture surplus is shaped by different modes of competition, such as the ability to attract customers through rewards programs or the ability to patent inventions and enforce intellectual property rights.
520 $a In Chapter 1 I present a novel contract theoretic explanation of the profitability and management of loyalty programs. I study a model where an airline faces uncertain demand, consumers learn how much they are willing to pay for a flight over time, and the frequent flyer program provides the airline with a way to contract with consumers ex ante, before uncertainty is resolved. The firm lacks the ability to commit to future prices and allocations ex ante, and may only commit that it will allocate ex post unsold capacity to members of its points program. I characterize the optimal mechanism in this setting: the airline sells points to all consumers ex ante, it then posts a price for a guaranteed seat at the interim stage, and finally it freely gives away any unsold seats to members of its points program through a lottery. The points program introduces an endogenous type-dependent outside option for consumers at the interim stage, which generates novel pricing incentives in the firm's contracting problem. The optimal mechanism yields larger revenue than the canonical static screening mechanism, and is more efficient; the airline captures all of the resulting gains in total surplus through the sale of points ex ante.
520 $a In Chapter 2 I extend the results and intuition of the model in Chapter 1 to a competitive setting. I study a duopoly model of dynamic pricing where two capacity constrained firms sell differentiated goods to consumers who learn their valuations for the goods over time. I endow the firms with the ability to sell ex ante the rights to residual capacity. This gives the firms a particular form of limited commitment: firms cannot commit to future prices and allocations, but they can commit to give away unsold capacity ex post. I characterize the optimal contract in this setting: firms charge a price for 'points' ex ante, before private information is revealed, at the interim stage they post a price which gives a consumer the good with certainty, and then finally all unsold capacity is randomly allocated through a lottery. Relative to the case of a monopolist, firms can still benefit from the adoption of such a points contract, despite the fact that each firm imposes negative externalities on its rival both ex ante (i.e. in the pricing of points) and ex interim (i.e. in the pricing of goods).
520 $a In Chapter 3, joint with Jorge Lemus, we study a model of R&D and patent enforcement to study the effect of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) on firms' incentives to invest in research and enforce intellectual property. Such firms play an increasingly important role in business strategy, innovation, and litigation. Their strategic advantage comes from the ability to fend off counter-suits. We develop a model to identify channels through which outsourcing patent enforcement to PAEs ("privateering'') can affect the incentives of operating companies. We find that PAEs can reduce transaction costs involved in patent monetization, thus enhancing firms' incentives to invest in R&D. On the other hand, they can lower these incentives by reducing the defensive value of patents, and also by decreasing total industry profits. In our model, the welfare effects of PAEs on firms and consumers can be positive, even when they increase litigation threats, lower industry profits, and acquire patents only for monetization reasons.
590 $a School code: 0163.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Economics. $3 1020895
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-10A(E).
790 $a 0163
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3705378