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Policy Issues in For-profit Higher E...

Lau, Christopher V.

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Policy Issues in For-profit Higher Education.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Policy Issues in For-profit Higher Education./
作者:	Lau, Christopher V.
面頁冊數:	157 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
標題:	Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3705300
ISBN:	9781321782066

Policy Issues in For-profit Higher Education.
Lau, Christopher V.

Policy Issues in For-profit Higher Education. - 157 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation analyzes the for-profit higher education industry and examines three federal policies that have influenced the way proprietary schools act.

ISBN: 9781321782066Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

Policy Issues in For-profit Higher Education.
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300 $a 157 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Aviv Nevo; Jonathan Guryan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This dissertation analyzes the for-profit higher education industry and examines three federal policies that have influenced the way proprietary schools act.
520 $a Chapter 1: The Incidence of Federal Subsidies in For-profit Higher Education. Over the past few decades, tuition prices and enrollment at for-profit institutions of higher education have grown significantly. With this, students have relied more heavily on federal financial aid to relieve their financial burdens in pursuing a postsecondary degree. For-profit higher education is a differentiated products oligopoly; schools are differentiated both horizontally (individual preferences) and vertically (quality differences). In such a market, the pass-through, or incidence, of federal aid is not clear a priori. This chapter finds to what extent federal financial aid improves the consumer surplus of students and to what extent it improves the producer surplus of the schools. To incorporate the market structure of for-profit higher education, I estimate a model of higher education choice (demand) and university pricing (supply) to compute the welfare effects of Federal Student Aid. I estimate that on average, 57 percent of federal grant aid and 51 percent of federal loan aid is passed through to for-profit colleges. In addition, I find that both federal grant aid and federal loan aid increase enrollment to for-profit colleges. Interestingly, I also find that on average, the existence of grants actually encourages schools to decrease their prices, while the existence of loans encourages schools to increase prices. The reason this occurs is because financial aid affects prices in two ways. The first way is through the intensive margin, where a standard demand shock encourages colleges to increase prices. The second way is through the extensive margin by changing the composition of students who consider attending college, which makes demand at the margin more elastic and encourages colleges to decrease prices. I find that the effect on the extensive margin dominates the effect on the intensive margin when grants are introduced, however the opposite occurs for loans.
520 $a Chapter 2: The Effect of the 90/10 Rule on For-profit Higher Education. The 90/10 rule specifies that proprietary institutions of higher education can have at most 90 percent of their total revenue come from Title IV federal funding. This primarily includes federal subsidies such as Pell grants and Stafford student loans. Penalty for violating this rule is the loss of federal student aid eligibility. However, because for-profit schools tend to cater to students who heavily rely on financial aid, many colleges have found that they are endangered of violating the rule. This chapter examines the strategies for-profit colleges have taken to satisfy the 90/10 rule, with a particular focus on pricing. To do this, I develop a model of higher education choice (demand) and for-profit college pricing (supply). The supply model assumes that schools compete in an oligopolistic setting and that colleges price incorporating the fact that proprietary institutions are subject to the 90/10 rule in order to remain eligible for financial aid. I use this model to simulate the price when the 90/10 rule is not taken into account; that is, I solve for the unconstrained price. I find that tuition prices increase on average by \$936 when schools are constrained by the 90/10 rule, and that schools that have a higher probability of violation and are more constrained, increase their prices by more.
520 $a Chapter 3: Responsiveness to Cohort Default Rates for Federal Student Loans. Cohort default rates (CDR) have become an important and controversial subject in for-profit higher education. One issue has revolved around how colleges manage these rates to satisfy federal regulation under the threat of losing financial aid eligibility. This chapter uses a policy change to see whether or not for-profit schools were able to adjust their CDR to prevent violation. More specifically, the government changed the time horizon under which schools were being penalized; the CDR is now defined as the percentage of borrowers to default three years after entering repayment, while it was previously defined as two years after. This altered the incentives for how to adjust the CDR, if schools could in fact respond. In particular, evidence of CDR responsiveness is consistent with the policy change reducing the reported number of students who default in the third year. I find that there was indeed about a 3-4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of reported third year defaulters at for-profit institutions, while there was no significant change for other sectors of higher education. However, I am not able to identify how for-profit schools were able to lower the number of reported student defaults. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
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