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Exploring the Relationship Between B...

Wesolowski, James A.

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Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis./
Author:	Wesolowski, James A.
Description:	187 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-05A(E).
Subject:	Business administration. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3578848
ISBN:	9781303735516

Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Wesolowski, James A.

Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis. - 187 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northcentral University, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The 2008 financial crisis has been identified as a contributor to the worst recession since the Great Depression. Congress enacted the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and authorized $700 billion in bailout funds to avert financial disaster. Post-hoc analysis of the TARP recipients, including a federal inquiry, identified high executive compensation as a major contributing factor to the crisis. Deliberate selection of risky capital structure, business models, and strategies by some bank CEOs were some of the unethical factors cited. Using mediation analysis, the purpose of this non-experimental quantitative study was to determine whether a relationship existed between bank CEO compensation structure, the selection of capital structure, and the receipt of TARP funding. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to examine the relationships. In this study, NASDAQ listed banks were the representative sample of United States banks. SEM analysis did not detect any mediation relationships between CEO compensation structure, capital structure, and the receipt of TARP funding. The debt, debt-to-equity, and repo-to-total liabilities capital structure ratios were found to predict the receipt of TARP funding, beta = 0.2351, p < .0000; beta = -0.1810, p < .0000; and beta = 0.1312, p < .0000, respectively. Significant differences between TARP and non-TARP funded banks indicated that TARP banks had riskier capital structures that were higher in debt, lower in equity, and used higher levels of repurchase agreements. The findings indicated that compensation plans high in equity, options, and bonuses contradict the relationship of CEO compensation and performance behavior supported by agency and prospect theories. The findings suggested CEOs are paid regardless of performance or the strategies selected and that managerial power theory is a better explanation of higher than average compensation. It was found that deferred compensation, pension, and perquisites predicted the receipt of TARP funding, beta = -0.2351, p < .026, and increase use reduced the need for funding. The findings supported the claim that many banks were undercapitalized and high in debt, including risky usage of repurchase agreements. As the result of the data collection, it was found that there is a need for standardized financial reporting to permit comparison and the identification of risk.

ISBN: 9781303735516Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168311
Business administration.

Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.
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020 $a 9781303735516
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100 1 $a Wesolowski, James A. $3 3175065
245 1 0 $a Exploring the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation Structure, Risky Capital Structure, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.
300 $a 187 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Sherry Lowrance.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northcentral University, 2014.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a The 2008 financial crisis has been identified as a contributor to the worst recession since the Great Depression. Congress enacted the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and authorized $700 billion in bailout funds to avert financial disaster. Post-hoc analysis of the TARP recipients, including a federal inquiry, identified high executive compensation as a major contributing factor to the crisis. Deliberate selection of risky capital structure, business models, and strategies by some bank CEOs were some of the unethical factors cited. Using mediation analysis, the purpose of this non-experimental quantitative study was to determine whether a relationship existed between bank CEO compensation structure, the selection of capital structure, and the receipt of TARP funding. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to examine the relationships. In this study, NASDAQ listed banks were the representative sample of United States banks. SEM analysis did not detect any mediation relationships between CEO compensation structure, capital structure, and the receipt of TARP funding. The debt, debt-to-equity, and repo-to-total liabilities capital structure ratios were found to predict the receipt of TARP funding, beta = 0.2351, p < .0000; beta = -0.1810, p < .0000; and beta = 0.1312, p < .0000, respectively. Significant differences between TARP and non-TARP funded banks indicated that TARP banks had riskier capital structures that were higher in debt, lower in equity, and used higher levels of repurchase agreements. The findings indicated that compensation plans high in equity, options, and bonuses contradict the relationship of CEO compensation and performance behavior supported by agency and prospect theories. The findings suggested CEOs are paid regardless of performance or the strategies selected and that managerial power theory is a better explanation of higher than average compensation. It was found that deferred compensation, pension, and perquisites predicted the receipt of TARP funding, beta = -0.2351, p < .026, and increase use reduced the need for funding. The findings supported the claim that many banks were undercapitalized and high in debt, including risky usage of repurchase agreements. As the result of the data collection, it was found that there is a need for standardized financial reporting to permit comparison and the identification of risk.
590 $a School code: 1443.
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650 4 $a Labor relations. $3 3172144
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
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710 2 $a Northcentral University. $3 1018547
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-05A(E).
790 $a 1443
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3578848