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The Madison Oil case: A study of car...

Johnsen, D. Bruce.

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The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior./
Author:	Johnsen, D. Bruce.
Description:	350 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 49-04, Section: A, page: 8980.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International49-04A.
Subject:	Commerce-Business. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8810541

The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior.
Johnsen, D. Bruce.

The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior. - 350 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 49-04, Section: A, page: 8980.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 1987.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The Madison Oil defendants, twelve so-called "Major" refiners, were convicted of conspiring to fix gasoline prices in the Midwestern area during 1935 and 1936. They are said to have carried out their conspiracy by systematically purchasing gasoline from so-called "Independent" refiners on the Mid-continent spot market. The problem is that price fixing requires a restriction of industry output to be successful, and open-market buying has nothing to do with that. As professed by one witness, in the absence of a concerted output restriction by the Majors, open-market buying would have been as useless as "mopping up the ocean." In fact, evidence from the trial record indicates that the Majors were indeed restricting refinery output. But once having done this, why would they have bothered to purchase gasoline on the open market?Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior.
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100 1 $a Johnsen, D. Bruce. $3 3174983
245 1 4 $a The Madison Oil case: A study of cartel behavior.
300 $a 350 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 49-04, Section: A, page: 8980.
500 $a Chairperson: Yoram Barzel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 1987.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a The Madison Oil defendants, twelve so-called "Major" refiners, were convicted of conspiring to fix gasoline prices in the Midwestern area during 1935 and 1936. They are said to have carried out their conspiracy by systematically purchasing gasoline from so-called "Independent" refiners on the Mid-continent spot market. The problem is that price fixing requires a restriction of industry output to be successful, and open-market buying has nothing to do with that. As professed by one witness, in the absence of a concerted output restriction by the Majors, open-market buying would have been as useless as "mopping up the ocean." In fact, evidence from the trial record indicates that the Majors were indeed restricting refinery output. But once having done this, why would they have bothered to purchase gasoline on the open market?
520 $a The answer to this question relies, in part, on the costs of assuring optimal participation in cartel and, in part, on the Major's desire to enforce property rights to their investments in brandname capital. To assure the Independents' participation in the cartel, the Majors made "sidepayments" to them in the form of disproportionately large production allocations. Once having done this, however, the Majors found it necessary to purchase part of the Independents' allocation in order to provide their branded distributors with an adequate supply of gasoline at the cartel price. In the absence of open-market buying by the Majors, their distributors would have engaged in gasoline adulteration by purchasing inexpensive, low-quality gasoline on the spot market and secretly selling it through their branded pumps. This would have tarnished the Majors' reputations as sellers of high-quality gasoline and reduced the return to their investments in establishing brandnames. Instead, the Majors purchased the gasoline, tested its quality, and either reformed it, blended it, or sent it on to their branded distributors.
590 $a School code: 0250.
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
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710 2 $a University of Washington. $3 545923
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 49-04A.
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1987
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8810541