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The determinants of political violence.

Browne, Julie.

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The determinants of political violence.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The determinants of political violence./
作者:	Browne, Julie.
面頁冊數:	105 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-01A(E).
標題:	Political Science, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3635100
ISBN:	9781321160383

The determinants of political violence.
Browne, Julie.

The determinants of political violence. - 105 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2013.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation focuses on the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. I examine not only how forces at the international level, such as economic sanctions and transnational wars, impact the relationship between governments and domestic groups, but also how political changes at the domestic level impact foreign policy decisions. The dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper presents the results of a cross-national quantitative analysis of the effect of economic sanctions on political repression. The results of this analysis indicate that economic sanctions lead to an increase in political repression in targeted states. The second paper empirically evaluates the validity of three competing explanatory models for the democratic peace, the normative, the institutional and the selectorate, by testing their differing predictions on the war aims of transitional democracies. The results of these empirical tests indicate that transitional democracies, like autocracies, wage war for spoils, such as territory. This finding supports the selectorate democratic peace theory. The third paper is a formal model of a rebel group and a government fighting a rebellion in the shadow of an international war. As the probability that the government will win the international war increases, the expected utility for the rebels to exploit the government's temporary weakness and continue the rebellion increases. Also as the probability that the government will win the international war increases, the Government becomes less likely to appease the rebels. Thus if a government is powerful and favored to defeat its foreign enemies its domestic struggles are likely to continue during international wars.

ISBN: 9781321160383Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

The determinants of political violence.
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520 $a This dissertation focuses on the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. I examine not only how forces at the international level, such as economic sanctions and transnational wars, impact the relationship between governments and domestic groups, but also how political changes at the domestic level impact foreign policy decisions. The dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper presents the results of a cross-national quantitative analysis of the effect of economic sanctions on political repression. The results of this analysis indicate that economic sanctions lead to an increase in political repression in targeted states. The second paper empirically evaluates the validity of three competing explanatory models for the democratic peace, the normative, the institutional and the selectorate, by testing their differing predictions on the war aims of transitional democracies. The results of these empirical tests indicate that transitional democracies, like autocracies, wage war for spoils, such as territory. This finding supports the selectorate democratic peace theory. The third paper is a formal model of a rebel group and a government fighting a rebellion in the shadow of an international war. As the probability that the government will win the international war increases, the expected utility for the rebels to exploit the government's temporary weakness and continue the rebellion increases. Also as the probability that the government will win the international war increases, the Government becomes less likely to appease the rebels. Thus if a government is powerful and favored to defeat its foreign enemies its domestic struggles are likely to continue during international wars.
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