東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Essays on *regulation of public uti...

Surana, Sunita.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods./
Author:	Surana, Sunita.
Description:	201 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4117.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-11A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3196900
ISBN:	9780542427732

Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods.
Surana, Sunita.

Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods. - 201 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4117.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2005.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter provides a general introduction. The second chapter analyzes the impact of politics on regulatory contracts in the public transportation industry. While adopting an incentive regulation framework, we take into account such political factors by considering a non benevolent regulator. We estimate the parameters of the demand and cost functions as well as the shadow cost of public funds, the density of firms' types and the weight associated with consumer surplus as a function of political factors and financial constraints faced by cities. Empirical results, using data from French bus transit contracts, show that cities with leftist majorities and with environmentalists in their councils tend to put larger weights on consumer surplus leading them to lower the price for public transportation. As expected, the level of debt per capita restraints the cities in their redistributive policies.

ISBN: 9780542427732Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods.
LDR:03375nmm a2200325 4500 001 2057819
005 20150622091121.5
008 170521s2005 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780542427732
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3196900
035 $a AAI3196900
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Surana, Sunita. $3 3171702
245 1 0 $a Essays on *regulation of public utilities and the provision of public goods.
300 $a 201 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4117.
500 $a Adviser: Guofu Tan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2005.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter provides a general introduction. The second chapter analyzes the impact of politics on regulatory contracts in the public transportation industry. While adopting an incentive regulation framework, we take into account such political factors by considering a non benevolent regulator. We estimate the parameters of the demand and cost functions as well as the shadow cost of public funds, the density of firms' types and the weight associated with consumer surplus as a function of political factors and financial constraints faced by cities. Empirical results, using data from French bus transit contracts, show that cities with leftist majorities and with environmentalists in their councils tend to put larger weights on consumer surplus leading them to lower the price for public transportation. As expected, the level of debt per capita restraints the cities in their redistributive policies.
520 $a In the third chapter we study incentive regulatory contracts that set some aspect of product quality as well as price. We first extend the Laffont and Tirole (1990) model to incorporate stochastic demand and cost, find the optimal contract in the presence of asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm, and suggest how it can be implemented. We then derive the econometric model and estimate the consumer's demand function, the firm's quality adjusted cost function, the distribution of the firms' type, and the shadow cost of public funds again using data from French urban transportation.
520 $a The fourth chapter develops a theory of the evolution of preferences for reciprocity, trust, and the voluntary provision of public goods in a society composed exclusively of rational, Bayesian optimizers. We study the evolution of a community consisting of "opportunists," who simply maximize material payoffs, and "reciprocators," who prefer joint cooperation to exploiting their opponents. In equilibrium, opportunists contribute to the provision of the public good in order to maintain reputations for being reciprocators, so as to be trusted in their private market transactions. The need to provide a public good enhances the evolutionary stability of the reciprocator type. The model is tested using U.S. survey data on trust.
590 $a School code: 0208.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Transportation. $3 555912
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0709
710 2 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-11A.
790 $a 0208
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3196900