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Financial intermediation, fragility ...

Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia.

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Financial intermediation, fragility and regulation.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Financial intermediation, fragility and regulation./
作者:	Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia.
面頁冊數:	185 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-07A(E).
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3614892
ISBN:	9781303805875

Financial intermediation, fragility and regulation.
Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia.

Financial intermediation, fragility and regulation. - 185 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

After the last financial crisis, there has been a growing interest in financial institutions and their interaction with the real economy as a potential source of fragility. This interest has surged not only among academics but also in the policymakers' agendas. A clear example is the money market fund (MMF) industry. The regulations that are being considered target institutional features particular to MMFs, and, therefore, the existing models of financial intermediation are not suited to shed light on the policy discussion. In the first chapter I develop a model of MMFs and use it to understand the trade-offs involved in the adoption of some of the proposed regulations. The model shows that features of MMFs that are supposed to enhance the stability of the funds may be a source of fragility to the industry. Moreover, it shows that general equilibrium effects that are currently not part of the policy discussion can overturn conventional intuition. The crisis also led to changes in the global regulatory standards for commercial banks: capital, liquidity, and transparency standards were tightened by Basel III. In chapter 2 I focus on the required increase in transparency and analyze its effect on welfare and the economy's proneness to bank runs. In a model of banking with imperfect information about the value of a bank's assets, I find that more precise information need not be better: it may make the economy more fragile in the sense that bank runs are likely to occur, and it may decrease welfare. Debt obligations collateralized by financial assets were also important in the development of the financial crisis. The financial assets used as collateral could also have been sold to raise funds. Moreover, those assets were not productive assets and, in principle, their intrinsic value was the same independently of the assets' holder. In chapter 3 I develop a model to understand why many financial institutions choose to use their assets as collateral instead of selling them to raise funds.

ISBN: 9781303805875Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Financial intermediation, fragility and regulation.
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520 $a After the last financial crisis, there has been a growing interest in financial institutions and their interaction with the real economy as a potential source of fragility. This interest has surged not only among academics but also in the policymakers' agendas. A clear example is the money market fund (MMF) industry. The regulations that are being considered target institutional features particular to MMFs, and, therefore, the existing models of financial intermediation are not suited to shed light on the policy discussion. In the first chapter I develop a model of MMFs and use it to understand the trade-offs involved in the adoption of some of the proposed regulations. The model shows that features of MMFs that are supposed to enhance the stability of the funds may be a source of fragility to the industry. Moreover, it shows that general equilibrium effects that are currently not part of the policy discussion can overturn conventional intuition. The crisis also led to changes in the global regulatory standards for commercial banks: capital, liquidity, and transparency standards were tightened by Basel III. In chapter 2 I focus on the required increase in transparency and analyze its effect on welfare and the economy's proneness to bank runs. In a model of banking with imperfect information about the value of a bank's assets, I find that more precise information need not be better: it may make the economy more fragile in the sense that bank runs are likely to occur, and it may decrease welfare. Debt obligations collateralized by financial assets were also important in the development of the financial crisis. The financial assets used as collateral could also have been sold to raise funds. Moreover, those assets were not productive assets and, in principle, their intrinsic value was the same independently of the assets' holder. In chapter 3 I develop a model to understand why many financial institutions choose to use their assets as collateral instead of selling them to raise funds.
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