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Formulating principal-agent service ...
~
Zeng, Shuo.
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Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
Record Type:
Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit/ by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror.
Author:
Zeng, Shuo.
other author:
Dror, Moshe.
Published:
Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2016.,
Description:
ix, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:
Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.
Contained By:
Springer eBooks
Subject:
Operations research. -
Online resource:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6
ISBN:
9783319186726$q(electronic bk.)
Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
Zeng, Shuo.
Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
[electronic resource] /by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016. - ix, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in operations management. - SpringerBriefs in operations management..
Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.
This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
ISBN: 9783319186726$q(electronic bk.)
Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
547123
Operations research.
LC Class. No.: T57.6
Dewey Class. No.: 658.4034
Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
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This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
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Business and Economics (Springer-11643)
based on 0 review(s)
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1 records • Pages 1 •
1
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Attachments
W9275716
電子資源
11.線上閱覽_V
電子書
EB T57.6 .Z54 2016
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1 records • Pages 1 •
1
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