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Formulating principal-agent service ...

Zeng, Shuo.

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Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit/ by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror.
Author:	Zeng, Shuo.
other author:	Dror, Moshe.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2016.,
Description:	ix, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Operations research. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6
ISBN:	9783319186726$q(electronic bk.)

Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
Zeng, Shuo.

Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit[electronic resource] /by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016. - ix, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in operations management. - SpringerBriefs in operations management..

Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.

ISBN: 9783319186726$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

547123
Operations research.

LC Class. No.: T57.6

Dewey Class. No.: 658.4034

Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
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100 1 $a Zeng, Shuo. $3 2178884
245 1 0 $a Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit $h [electronic resource] / $c by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2016.
300 $a ix, 129 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a SpringerBriefs in operations management
505 0 $a Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.
520 $a This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
650 0 $a Operations research. $3 547123
650 0 $a Maintainability (Engineering) $3 656670
650 0 $a Outcome-based contracts. $3 2178886
650 1 4 $a Economics/Management Science. $3 890844
650 2 4 $a Operation Research/Decision Theory. $3 1620900
650 2 4 $a Operations Research, Management Science. $3 1532996
650 2 4 $a Transportation. $3 555912
700 1 $a Dror, Moshe. $3 757324
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 836513
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830 0 $a SpringerBriefs in operations management. $3 2178885
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6
950 $a Business and Economics (Springer-11643)