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Rational queueing /

Hassin, Refael.

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Rational queueing /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Rational queueing // Refael Hassin.
作者:	Hassin, Refael.
出版者:	Boca Raton, FL :CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, : c2016.,
面頁冊數:	xiii, 378 p. :ill. ;25 cm.
附註:	"A Chapman & Hall book."
內容註:	Observable queues -- Information -- Customer decisions -- Social optimization and cooperation -- Monopoly -- Competition -- Routing in queueing networks -- Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting -- Vacations -- Bounded rationality.
標題:	Queuing theory. -
ISBN:	9781498745277

Rational queueing /
Hassin, Refael.

Rational queueing /Refael Hassin. - Boca Raton, FL :CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group,c2016. - xiii, 378 p. :ill. ;25 cm.

"A Chapman & Hall book."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-362) and indexes.

Observable queues -- Information -- Customer decisions -- Social optimization and cooperation -- Monopoly -- Competition -- Routing in queueing networks -- Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting -- Vacations -- Bounded rationality.

"Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents."--

ISBN: 9781498745277UK57.99Subjects--Topical Terms:

591829
Queuing theory.

LC Class. No.: T57.9 / .H37 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 658.4/034

Rational queueing /
LDR:02065cam a2200205 a 4500 001 2017452
003 OCoLC
005 20160525081413.0
008 161003s2016 flua b 001 0 eng d
020 $a 9781498745277 $q (hardback ; $q alk. paper) : $c UK57.99
020 $a 149874527X $q (hardback ; $q alk. paper)
040 $a YDXCP $b eng $c YDXCP $d BTCTA $d BDX $d OCLCQ $d OCLCO $d TKN $d OCLCF $d CDX $d KSU
050 4 $a T57.9 $b .H37 2016
082 0 4 $a 658.4/034 $2 23
100 1 $a Hassin, Refael. $3 757076
245 1 0 $a Rational queueing / $c Refael Hassin.
260 $a Boca Raton, FL : $b CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, $c c2016.
300 $a xiii, 378 p. : $b ill. ; $c 25 cm.
500 $a "A Chapman & Hall book."
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-362) and indexes.
505 0 $a Observable queues -- Information -- Customer decisions -- Social optimization and cooperation -- Monopoly -- Competition -- Routing in queueing networks -- Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting -- Vacations -- Bounded rationality.
520 $a "Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents."-- $c Provided by publisher.
650 0 $a Queuing theory. $3 591829
650 0 $a Probabilities. $3 518889
650 0 $a Consumer behavior. $3 535816