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Physicalism, dualism and the mind-bo...

Morris, Dolores G.

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Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem./
Author:	Morris, Dolores G.
Description:	204 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1311.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-04A.
Subject:	Metaphysics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3441740
ISBN:	9781124468068

Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem.
Morris, Dolores G.

Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem. - 204 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1311.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2010.

In this dissertation, I examine the implications of the problem of mental causation and what David Chalmers has dubbed the "hard problem of consciousness" for competing accounts of the mind. I begin, in Chapter One, with a critical analysis of Jaegwon Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. (2005) There, I maintain that Kim's ontology cannot adequately address both the problem of mental causation and the "hard problem of consciousness." In Chapter Two, I examine the causal pairing problem for substance dualism. I demonstrate both that the substance dualist can respond to the argument at no great cost, and that the pairing problem applies, with equal force, to the irreducible qualia posited on Kim's account.

ISBN: 9781124468068

LCCN: AAI3441740Subjects--Topical Terms:

517082
Metaphysics.

Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem.
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100 1 $a Morris, Dolores G. $3 2144913
245 1 0 $a Physicalism, dualism and the mind-body problem.
300 $a 204 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1311.
500 $a Adviser: Alvin Plantinga.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2010.
520 $a In this dissertation, I examine the implications of the problem of mental causation and what David Chalmers has dubbed the "hard problem of consciousness" for competing accounts of the mind. I begin, in Chapter One, with a critical analysis of Jaegwon Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. (2005) There, I maintain that Kim's ontology cannot adequately address both the problem of mental causation and the "hard problem of consciousness." In Chapter Two, I examine the causal pairing problem for substance dualism. I demonstrate both that the substance dualist can respond to the argument at no great cost, and that the pairing problem applies, with equal force, to the irreducible qualia posited on Kim's account.
520 $a Chapters Three and Four are devoted to what I take to be the central argument against any kind of dualism: the causal exclusion argument. In Chapter Three, I examine dualistic responses to the exclusion argument that grant the causal closure of the physical world. I note that these responses, though technically adequate, are nevertheless theoretically unpalatable. In addition to requiring the dualist to adopt unconventional attitudes towards causation, responses of this variety also have the unfortunate result of rendering libertarian freedom impossible. Finally, in Chapter Four, I turn my attention to the question of causal closure. I maintain that the causal closure of the physical world, though widely affirmed, is nevertheless extraordinarily difficult to support. In light of Hempel's Dilemma, causal closure is either false, compatible with dualistic interaction, or unacceptably stipulative. There is, I maintain no causal closure principle up to the tasks required by the causal exclusion argument. For that reason, I conclude that the dualist ought not to worry about causal closure.
590 $a School code: 0165.
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
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710 2 $a University of Notre Dame. $3 807615
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-04A.
790 $a 0165
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3441740