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Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regu...

Safa, Mohammad Faisal As.

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Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance./
作者:	Safa, Mohammad Faisal As.
面頁冊數:	72 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-12A(E).
標題:	Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3573943
ISBN:	9781303455520

Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance.
Safa, Mohammad Faisal As.

Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance. - 72 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of New Orleans, 2013.

In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of various risks faced by commercial banks on the executive compensation in banking industry. Executives in any industry are, on average, risk averse if their compensation is not tied to the long term performance of the firm. Commercial bank executives are more risk averse due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism. Commercial banks face various risks because of the regulatory mechanism and unique asset structure of the firm. Because commercial bank executives are riskaverse, it is expected that they should associate their own pay and pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) with the risks their banks face.

ISBN: 9781303455520Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance.
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100 1 $a Safa, Mohammad Faisal As. $3 2103843
245 1 0 $a Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance.
300 $a 72 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Mohammad Kabir Hassan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of New Orleans, 2013.
520 $a In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of various risks faced by commercial banks on the executive compensation in banking industry. Executives in any industry are, on average, risk averse if their compensation is not tied to the long term performance of the firm. Commercial bank executives are more risk averse due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism. Commercial banks face various risks because of the regulatory mechanism and unique asset structure of the firm. Because commercial bank executives are riskaverse, it is expected that they should associate their own pay and pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) with the risks their banks face.
520 $a I use a dataset of 149 commercial banks and compensation of 1,248 executives. The results show that bank executives associate their performance based pay with both idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. But they associate their fixed pay only with systematic risk. The risk based PPS is also affected by the idiosyncratic risk but not by the systematic risk. Both asset return risk and insolvency risk have significant positive effect on PPS. Executives also associate their performance based pay with asset return risk because the asset structure of banks is different and proper management of such assets is also a performance measure for these executives. All these results imply that the risk-averse nature of bank executives as they demand premium compensation for the exposure to different risks faced by the firm.
520 $a In the second chapter, I analyze the regulatory effect on the governance mechanism in banking industry in addition to the board governance mechanism. Using a sample of 37,354 executives including both CEOs and other executives from banking and all other industries I find that the bank executives put significantly higher emphasis on the fixed compensation in terms of salary and bonus, and significantly lower emphasis on the performance based compensation. Bank executives also put minimum emphasis on the risk based PPS although they put significant emphasis on return based PPS. Also bank executives put higher emphasis on performance based pay and lower emphasis on fixed pay as such regulatory binding relaxes over time. This again indicates the risk-averse nature of the bank executives due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism.
590 $a School code: 0108.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
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710 2 $a University of New Orleans. $b Financial Economics. $3 2103844
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-12A(E).
790 $a 0108
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3573943