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Corporate Governance, Performance an...

O'Sullivan, Jennifer A.

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Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry./
作者:	O'Sullivan, Jennifer A.
面頁冊數:	85 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-03A(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3531151
ISBN:	9781267721969

Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry.
O'Sullivan, Jennifer A.

Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry. - 85 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of New Orleans, 2012.

In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin's Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net chargeoffs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin's Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive effect on firm performance. We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics changed during the crisis. Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin's Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. Further, we find that board structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis.

ISBN: 9781267721969Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry.
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245 1 0 $a Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry.
300 $a 85 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Kabir Hassan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of New Orleans, 2012.
520 $a In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin's Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net chargeoffs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin's Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive effect on firm performance. We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics changed during the crisis. Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin's Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. Further, we find that board structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis.
520 $a We next examine the relationship between risk-taking of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-taking including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk. We also use three market based proxies for bank risk including market beta, idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation of its stock return. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board reduces both balance sheet and market risk. We further investigate the relationships between risk-taking and board characteristics changed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We find that our results are robust during the crisis.
520 $a KEYWORDS: bank performance, bank risk-taking, board characteristics, board of directors.
590 $a School code: 0108.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
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710 2 $a University of New Orleans. $3 1019084
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