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Banks' acquisition of private inform...

Chen, Po-Chang.

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Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting./
作者:	Chen, Po-Chang.
面頁冊數:	71 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-01A(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3600658
ISBN:	9781303508738

Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting.
Chen, Po-Chang.

Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting. - 71 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012.

This study investigates whether banks acquire information about the borrowing firms' subsequent financial restatements during the misreporting period, a period in which firms issue misstated financial reports. Finance theory suggests that banks have superior ability in gathering and processing information. In this paper, I test whether banks respond to financial misreporting by their client firms before this malpractice becomes known to the public.

ISBN: 9781303508738Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting.
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245 1 0 $a Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting.
300 $a 71 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: A. Rashad Abdel-Khalik.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012.
520 $a This study investigates whether banks acquire information about the borrowing firms' subsequent financial restatements during the misreporting period, a period in which firms issue misstated financial reports. Finance theory suggests that banks have superior ability in gathering and processing information. In this paper, I test whether banks respond to financial misreporting by their client firms before this malpractice becomes known to the public.
520 $a I find that bank loans initiated to restating firms during the misreporting period have significantly higher interest spreads, more restrictive financial covenants, and shorter loan maturities than loans made to non-restating firms. This finding suggests that banks are aware of and responsive to borrowers' ongoing financial misreporting. In contrast, equity holders do not respond differently to earnings announcements of restating firms than to those of non-restating firms. I also do not find an increase in analyst forecast dispersion for restating firms during the misreporting period. In addition, bondholders do not price new bond issues differently for restating and non-restating firms.
520 $a Taken together, these empirical findings suggest that banks possess private information about ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers, which allows them to adapt their decisions more quickly than equity investors, financial analysts, and public debtholders.
590 $a School code: 0090.
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650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
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710 2 $a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. $b Accountancy. $3 2096530
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-01A(E).
790 $a 0090
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2012
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3600658