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Moral hazard and internal discipline...

Li, Meng.

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Moral hazard and internal discipline: Theory and evidence.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Moral hazard and internal discipline: Theory and evidence./
作者:	Li, Meng.
面頁冊數:	82 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-01A(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3526330
ISBN:	9781267601988

Moral hazard and internal discipline: Theory and evidence.
Li, Meng.

Moral hazard and internal discipline: Theory and evidence. - 82 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2012.

I model managerial diversion in the presence of an agency problem between a manager and her subordinate. I show that the subordinate's incentive pay serves as an internal disciplinary mechanism to curb the manager's diversion of firm resources. I demonstrate that this mechanism is more effective as the diversion becomes more observable to the subordinate. Furthermore, I show that the sensitivity of the manager's diversion to observability increases (i) as the agency problem between the manager and her subordinate intensifies and (ii) as other corporate governance mechanisms weaken. Using a series of tests, I find empirical results that are largely consistent with my theoretical predictions. Specifically, I find that my three proxies for top management diversion---CEO excess compensation, CEO perquisite consumption, and the market reaction to acquirer acquisition announcements---are associated with my observability proxies in a way that is consistent with my theoretical predictions.

ISBN: 9781267601988Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Moral hazard and internal discipline: Theory and evidence.
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500 $a Advisers: Haresh Sapra; Douglas J. Skinner.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2012.
520 $a I model managerial diversion in the presence of an agency problem between a manager and her subordinate. I show that the subordinate's incentive pay serves as an internal disciplinary mechanism to curb the manager's diversion of firm resources. I demonstrate that this mechanism is more effective as the diversion becomes more observable to the subordinate. Furthermore, I show that the sensitivity of the manager's diversion to observability increases (i) as the agency problem between the manager and her subordinate intensifies and (ii) as other corporate governance mechanisms weaken. Using a series of tests, I find empirical results that are largely consistent with my theoretical predictions. Specifically, I find that my three proxies for top management diversion---CEO excess compensation, CEO perquisite consumption, and the market reaction to acquirer acquisition announcements---are associated with my observability proxies in a way that is consistent with my theoretical predictions.
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