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Three Essays on Applied Microeconomi...

Li, Xia.

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Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy./
Author:	Li, Xia.
Description:	133 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-01A(E).
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3594474
ISBN:	9781303389542

Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy.
Li, Xia.

Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy. - 133 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2013.

This dissertation focuses on applied microeconomics and corporate strategy.

ISBN: 9781303389542Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy.
LDR:03331nam a2200325 4500 001 1959543
005 20140520124325.5
008 150210s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303389542
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3594474
035 $a AAI3594474
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Li, Xia. $3 725029
245 1 0 $a Three Essays on Applied Microeconomics and Corporate Strategy.
300 $a 133 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Ian Gale; Guido Kuersteiner.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2013.
520 $a This dissertation focuses on applied microeconomics and corporate strategy.
520 $a Chapter 1 represents one of the first studies of indicative bidding, a commonly used procedure in the sales of complicated assets with substantial values. A parsimonious model captures the essence of the indicative bidding: first, there is a screen stage in which the bidders are asked to submit nonbinding preliminary indications of interest; second, only a subset of the potential bidders is select by the auctioneer; third, each entrant bidder must incur a substantial cost in order to bid; and finally, value updating and competitive information effects can be quite substantial during the second stage. I show that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists for indicative bidding, thus it is guaranteed that the most qualified bidders. Given the widespread practice of indicative bidding and the substantial value transaction involved, this theoretical justification is quite stimulating.
520 $a In Chapter 2, motivated by the strong evidence of entry behavior in corporate takeover practice, I model a two-stage auction procedure with endogenous entry, value updating, entry cost, and uncertain number of actual bidders. I show that within a more realistic (common) value updating paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, the optimal bidding strategy is not monotonic; and the seller's expected revenue and the expected total welfare is not monotonic. The results lay out a general structural framework to test empirically the optimality of auction mechanism design.
520 $a Since a number of high-profile corporate collapses and scandals have induced new governance regulations by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In Chapter 3, I examine the public firms' performance before and after the imposing of the new regulations. In a difference-in-differences panel regression model, I take into account firm-level characteristics, industrial business cycle and sample attrition. I find that the new regulations are associated with higher firm value. This strong evidence is important regarding the ongoing debate about the future of the Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protect Act in particular, and enhances the understanding of corporate governance in general.
520 $a INDEX WORDS: Auctions, Efficient entry, Entry cost, Corporate governance, Difference-in-difference, Sample attrition.
590 $a School code: 0076.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a Georgetown University. $b Economics. $3 1065101
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-01A(E).
790 $a 0076
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3594474