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Personal Identity, Wide Reflective E...

Nichols, Peter.

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Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative./
Author:	Nichols, Peter.
Description:	193 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-05A(E).
Subject:	Ethics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3547251
ISBN:	9781267818577

Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative.
Nichols, Peter.

Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative. - 193 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2012.

The metaphysics of our persistence through time carries significance for ethical issues such as moral responsibility, as well as prudential issues such as planning for one's future. Many philosophers adopt a "metaphysics first" approach in which they use their preferred metaphysical theories of personal identity to derive revisionary normative consequences. I reject this approach in favor of a more egalitarian one that appreciates the equal significance of metaphysical and normative considerations.

ISBN: 9781267818577Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.

Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative.
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Nichols, Peter. $3 2091966
245 1 0 $a Personal Identity, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, and the Autonomy of the Normative.
300 $a 193 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Alan Sidelle.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2012.
520 $a The metaphysics of our persistence through time carries significance for ethical issues such as moral responsibility, as well as prudential issues such as planning for one's future. Many philosophers adopt a "metaphysics first" approach in which they use their preferred metaphysical theories of personal identity to derive revisionary normative consequences. I reject this approach in favor of a more egalitarian one that appreciates the equal significance of metaphysical and normative considerations.
520 $a Against the metaphysics first view, I argue that (1) we lack the epistemic justification for any theory of personal identity that we would need to justify a metaphysics first approach to the issue, and (2) most theories of personal identity and survival rely crucially on normative intuitions, and thus, are not purely metaphysical theories in the first place. Ultimately, I argue that we do not need a metaphysical theory of personal identity in order to properly reason about "survival associated" normative issues such as moral responsibility and rational prudential future concern.
520 $a As an alternative to the metaphysics first approach, I defend a foundationalist version Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) that does not grant epistemic or methodological priority to either metaphysics or ethics. In applying WRE, we begin by testing any given belief, whether ethical or metaphysical, by checking it for obvious sources of bias. Next, we check it for consistency with our other beliefs, including considered judgments about ethical cases, theoretical moral principles, and theoretical metaphysical principles. The aim is to achieve greater overall coherence among our beliefs, and thereby to elevate the justificatory status of those beliefs.
520 $a I conclude by responding to a number of objections, including the objection that our normative intuitions are unreliable, the objection that my method would sanction relativism, and the objection that my method implausibly generalizes to other domains. In response to these and other objections, I supplement WRE by (1) appealing to Mylan Engel's (1992) distinction between personal and doxastic justification, (2) requiring reasoners to display intellectual virtues, and (3) showing how the defender of foundationalist WRE can satisfactorily respond to the various versions of the objection that our normative intuitions are unreliable.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Ethics. $3 517264
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
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690 $a 0396
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710 2 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $b Philosophy. $3 2091967
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-05A(E).
790 1 0 $a Sidelle, Alan, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Shafer-Landau, Russ $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Sartorio, Carolina $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Titelbaum, Michael $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Streiffer, Robert $e committee member
790 $a 0262
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2012
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3547251