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Philosophical psychopathology : = ph...

Young, Garry, (1966-)

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Philosophical psychopathology : = philosophy without thought experiments /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Philosophical psychopathology :/ Garry Young.
其他題名:	philosophy without thought experiments /
作者:	Young, Garry,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource.
內容註:	1. Introduction -- PART I: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN INTENTIONAL ACTION -- 2. Philosophical Issue 1: Conscious Inessentialism -- 3. Blindsight and Other Visuomotor Pathologies -- 4. Philosophical Issue 2: What Makes an Action Intentional? -- 5. Anarchic Hand -- 6. Alien Control -- 7. Philosophical Issue 2 Revisited: Conscious Decision Making and Free Will -- PART II: THOUGHT, SUBJECTIVITY AND RATIONALITY -- 8. Philosophical Issue 3: What Makes a Thought My Thought? -- 9. Thought Insertion -- 10. Philosophical Issue 4: What is it to be Rational? -- 11. The Capgras Delusion -- 12. The Cotard Delusion -- PART III: KNOWLEDGE HOW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTION -- 13. Philosophical Issue 5: Ryle's Dichotomy and the Intellectualist Challenge -- 14. Visuomotor Pathologies Revisited.
標題:	Psychology, Pathological - Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9781137329325
ISBN:	1137329327 (electronic bk.)

Philosophical psychopathology : = philosophy without thought experiments /
Young, Garry,1966-

Philosophical psychopathology :philosophy without thought experiments /Garry Young. - 1 online resource.

1. Introduction -- PART I: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN INTENTIONAL ACTION -- 2. Philosophical Issue 1: Conscious Inessentialism -- 3. Blindsight and Other Visuomotor Pathologies -- 4. Philosophical Issue 2: What Makes an Action Intentional? -- 5. Anarchic Hand -- 6. Alien Control -- 7. Philosophical Issue 2 Revisited: Conscious Decision Making and Free Will -- PART II: THOUGHT, SUBJECTIVITY AND RATIONALITY -- 8. Philosophical Issue 3: What Makes a Thought My Thought? -- 9. Thought Insertion -- 10. Philosophical Issue 4: What is it to be Rational? -- 11. The Capgras Delusion -- 12. The Cotard Delusion -- PART III: KNOWLEDGE HOW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTION -- 13. Philosophical Issue 5: Ryle's Dichotomy and the Intellectualist Challenge -- 14. Visuomotor Pathologies Revisited.

Garry Young presents examples of rare pathological conditions such as blindsight, anarchic hand, alien control and various delusional states to inform fundamental questions on topics relating to consciousness, intentional action, thought and rationality, as well as what is required to possess certain kinds of knowledge. Rather than trying to answer these questions by inventing far-fetched scenario or 'thought experiments', this book argues that there is a better but, at present, under-used resource available: namely, clinical case studies evidence. Thus, when inquiry as to whether consciousness must necessarily accompany our intentional action, instead of creating a philosophical zombie why not look to the actions of those suffering from blindsight or visual agnosia. Similarly, when considering whether it is possible to doubt that one thinks, why invent a malicious demon as Descartes did when one can draw on delusional evidence from those suffering from thought insertion who deny certain thoughts are theirs.

ISBN: 1137329327 (electronic bk.)

Source: 665964Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

668468
Psychology, Pathological
--Philosophy.Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: RC437.5

Dewey Class. No.: 616.89001

Philosophical psychopathology : = philosophy without thought experiments /
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505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- PART I: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN INTENTIONAL ACTION -- 2. Philosophical Issue 1: Conscious Inessentialism -- 3. Blindsight and Other Visuomotor Pathologies -- 4. Philosophical Issue 2: What Makes an Action Intentional? -- 5. Anarchic Hand -- 6. Alien Control -- 7. Philosophical Issue 2 Revisited: Conscious Decision Making and Free Will -- PART II: THOUGHT, SUBJECTIVITY AND RATIONALITY -- 8. Philosophical Issue 3: What Makes a Thought My Thought? -- 9. Thought Insertion -- 10. Philosophical Issue 4: What is it to be Rational? -- 11. The Capgras Delusion -- 12. The Cotard Delusion -- PART III: KNOWLEDGE HOW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTION -- 13. Philosophical Issue 5: Ryle's Dichotomy and the Intellectualist Challenge -- 14. Visuomotor Pathologies Revisited.
520 $a Garry Young presents examples of rare pathological conditions such as blindsight, anarchic hand, alien control and various delusional states to inform fundamental questions on topics relating to consciousness, intentional action, thought and rationality, as well as what is required to possess certain kinds of knowledge. Rather than trying to answer these questions by inventing far-fetched scenario or 'thought experiments', this book argues that there is a better but, at present, under-used resource available: namely, clinical case studies evidence. Thus, when inquiry as to whether consciousness must necessarily accompany our intentional action, instead of creating a philosophical zombie why not look to the actions of those suffering from blindsight or visual agnosia. Similarly, when considering whether it is possible to doubt that one thinks, why invent a malicious demon as Descartes did when one can draw on delusional evidence from those suffering from thought insertion who deny certain thoughts are theirs.
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