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The financial crisis in Southeast As...

Kaplan, Idanna.

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The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand).

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand)./
作者:	Kaplan, Idanna.
面頁冊數:	193 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-12, Section: A, page: 4521.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-12A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9954050
ISBN:	0599571772

The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand).
Kaplan, Idanna.

The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand). - 193 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-12, Section: A, page: 4521.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 1999.

This study investigates whether implicit government guarantees to the banking system contributed to the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis. In particular, I examine the banking systems in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. The presence of implicit deposit guarantees removes the downside risk associated with bank lending and allows banks to compensate depositors at a lower interest rate. Thus deposit guarantees amount to an implicit subsidy to banks. The provision of this implicit subsidy, coupled with poor banking supervision, can generate a moral hazard for excessive risk taking.

ISBN: 0599571772Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand).
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245 1 4 $a The financial crisis in Southeast Asia: Measuring the size of implicit deposit insurance guarantees (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand).
300 $a 193 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-12, Section: A, page: 4521.
500 $a Chair: Philip Brock.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 1999.
520 $a This study investigates whether implicit government guarantees to the banking system contributed to the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis. In particular, I examine the banking systems in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. The presence of implicit deposit guarantees removes the downside risk associated with bank lending and allows banks to compensate depositors at a lower interest rate. Thus deposit guarantees amount to an implicit subsidy to banks. The provision of this implicit subsidy, coupled with poor banking supervision, can generate a moral hazard for excessive risk taking.
520 $a The aims of this dissertation are as follows. First, by using an option pricing technique that models deposit insurance as a put option on the unobserved value of bank assets with a strike price equal to bank debt, this dissertation measures the size of the contingent liabilities of Asian governments to their banking systems prior to the 1997 crisis. The results show that the magnitude of this subsidy in all five countries was large, but varied according to the severity of the ensuing financial crisis. Second, this dissertation evaluates the benefits and limitations of the option-pricing methodology in emerging market economies. By estimating the value of the implicit government guarantee to individual banks, I am able to identify weak banks before a crisis emerges. I also contrast the option-pricing results with traditional macroeconomic and balance sheet approaches and demonstrate that these alternative approaches are unable to identify weaknesses in each of the banking systems before the crisis. Third, to examine whether moral hazard incentives were likely to be present, I examine the institutional frameworks of the banking systems in these five Asian economies. These incentives may have induced banks to exploit the implicit government guarantee, thereby raising the ultimate costs of the banking crises.
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