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IMF conditionality and implementatio...

Ivanova, Anna.

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IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs./
作者:	Ivanova, Anna.
面頁冊數:	172 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1766.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3089658

IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs.
Ivanova, Anna.

IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs. - 172 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1766.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.

This dissertation analyzes the role and optimal design of IMF conditionality in the presence of domestic heterogeneity and examines the factors that determine successful implementation of IMF supported programs. The dissertation consists of three essays.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs.
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245 1 0 $a IMF conditionality and implementation of IMF-supported programs.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1766.
500 $a Supervisor: Charles M. Engel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.
520 $a This dissertation analyzes the role and optimal design of IMF conditionality in the presence of domestic heterogeneity and examines the factors that determine successful implementation of IMF supported programs. The dissertation consists of three essays.
520 $a The first two essays offer a model of IMF conditionality in the presence of opposition to reforms when government policy choice is observable and when the IMF cannot monitor government decisions. When opposition comes from an outside lobby, which benefits from distorted outcomes but faces a fixed cost to approach the government with its "deal", the equilibrium policy choice is simply a matter of the competitive power of the IMF versus the domestic lobby. The IMF disburses its loan according to the same schedule as the one that insures efficient allocation of resources between IMF borrowers and lenders in the absence of a lobby. Unobservability, however, weakens IMF's competitive power and the only player, who never loses from the fact that the IMF cannot monitor government decisions, is the lobby. In contrast, when opposition comes from the veto players, the IMF may find it worthwhile to "relax" conditionality in order to induce unpopular but potentially beneficial policies. When the IMF cannot monitor government decisions, outcome-based conditionality also plays a role of an incentive tool to motivate the government to implement necessary policy changes.
520 $a The third essay is an econometric study of the factors that determine successful implementation of IMF supported programs. The results suggest that program implementation depends primarily on the borrower's domestic political economy. Strong special interests in the parliament, political instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion and ethno-linguistic divisions weaken program implementation. Fund effort, the extent and structure of conditionality as well as initial and external conditions do not materially influence program prospects.
590 $a School code: 0262.
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