東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Six-month-one-day employee stock opt...

Zheng, Liu.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications./
Author:	Zheng, Liu.
Description:	64 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4529.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-12A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3116814

Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications.
Zheng, Liu.

Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications. - 64 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4529.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2003.

This dissertation investigates repricing activities after the FASB imposed an accounting charge for repriced options. I document significant economic ramifications in option repricing after the change of accounting treatment. I find that traditional repricing almost disappeared. Instead, many firms implemented 6&1 repricing (i.e., re-issuing new options in about six-months-plus-one-day after canceling old underwater options) to circumvent the accounting charge associated with repricing. Compared to firms that continuously use traditional repricing over the same period, 6&1 repricing firms show higher growth potential, have more analysts following, and expect higher accounting charges associated with stock price increases had they implemented traditional repricing. These results provide evidence that managers are concerned with lower reported earnings despite there being no cash flow impacts and the concerns are stronger in those firms that face greater capital market pressure to deliver earnings.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications.
LDR:02480nmm 2200265 4500 001 1862488
005 20041202093451.5
008 130614s2003 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3116814
035 $a AAI3116814
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Zheng, Liu. $3 1950037
245 1 0 $a Six-month-one-day employee stock option repricing: An examination of accounting considerations and incentive implications.
300 $a 64 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4529.
500 $a Adviser: Kenneth Merchant.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2003.
520 $a This dissertation investigates repricing activities after the FASB imposed an accounting charge for repriced options. I document significant economic ramifications in option repricing after the change of accounting treatment. I find that traditional repricing almost disappeared. Instead, many firms implemented 6&1 repricing (i.e., re-issuing new options in about six-months-plus-one-day after canceling old underwater options) to circumvent the accounting charge associated with repricing. Compared to firms that continuously use traditional repricing over the same period, 6&1 repricing firms show higher growth potential, have more analysts following, and expect higher accounting charges associated with stock price increases had they implemented traditional repricing. These results provide evidence that managers are concerned with lower reported earnings despite there being no cash flow impacts and the concerns are stronger in those firms that face greater capital market pressure to deliver earnings.
520 $a This dissertation also investigates whether managers behave opportunistically to maximize the value of their option awards under the 6&1 repricing setting where the option award date is fixed and known to managers ex ante. More specifically, I examine whether managers influence the exercise price of their option awards by accelerating bad news before and delaying good news after the option awards. As a contrast with anecdotal speculation and prior findings, I do not find evidence consistent with opportunistic disclosure in those 6&1 repricing firms.
590 $a School code: 0208.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
690 $a 0272
710 2 0 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-12A.
790 1 0 $a Merchant, Kenneth, $e advisor
790 $a 0208
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3116814