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Managerial guidance of market's expe...

Chen, Shuping.

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Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects./
Author:	Chen, Shuping.
Description:	89 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3363.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3103872

Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects.
Chen, Shuping.

Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects. - 89 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3363.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2003.

This dissertation investigates why, for a given level of earnings surprise, only some managers choose to provide earnings guidance to market participants. Using data from Company Issued Guidance File maintained by First Call from 1993 to 2000, I find that higher earnings informativeness, greater investor demand for information, and pressure from institutional investors and analysts motivate managers to guide market participants' earnings expectations. However, I find only mixed evidence on higher expected litigation costs providing incentives for managers to guide earnings expectations. These findings suggest that managers respond to market-based incentives to voluntarily provide value relevant information to market participants.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects.
LDR:01979nmm 2200265 4500 001 1862458
005 20041202093448.5
008 130614s2003 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3103872
035 $a AAI3103872
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Chen, Shuping. $3 1950008
245 1 0 $a Managerial guidance of market's expectations: Incentives and effects.
300 $a 89 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3363.
500 $a Adviser: Mark L. DeFond.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2003.
520 $a This dissertation investigates why, for a given level of earnings surprise, only some managers choose to provide earnings guidance to market participants. Using data from Company Issued Guidance File maintained by First Call from 1993 to 2000, I find that higher earnings informativeness, greater investor demand for information, and pressure from institutional investors and analysts motivate managers to guide market participants' earnings expectations. However, I find only mixed evidence on higher expected litigation costs providing incentives for managers to guide earnings expectations. These findings suggest that managers respond to market-based incentives to voluntarily provide value relevant information to market participants.
520 $a Tests examining the investment community's reaction to managerial earnings guidance find that analysts' forecast revisions tend to be larger and more frequent following downward guidance than upward guidance. Similarly, stock price response is larger following downward guidance than upward guidance, and the market appears to impound downward guidance more quickly into stock price.
590 $a School code: 0208.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
690 $a 0272
710 2 0 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-09A.
790 1 0 $a DeFond, Mark L., $e advisor
790 $a 0208
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3103872