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Bargaining behind bars: Peer and st...

Chen, Melvin Keith.

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Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus).

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus)./
Author:	Chen, Melvin Keith.
Description:	111 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1790.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091532

Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus).
Chen, Melvin Keith.

Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus). - 111 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1790.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

This thesis by M. Keith Chen was advised by Drew Fudenberg, David Laibson and Al Roth, and consists of three distinct papers. In the first paper I ask why negotiators often deal with numerous issues by ordering them in an agenda, when in theory separating components of a decision can preclude Pareto—improving tradeoffs. I characterize an extension of Rubinstein bargaining to the multiple-issue setting and show it has a simple and unique equilibrium agenda. Under this equilibrium issue-by-issue bargaining can ameliorate ex-ante bargaining risk, and allow bargainers to make <italic>implicit</italic>, if not <italic>explicit </italic>, tradeoffs between issues, with large distributional consequences. My results suggest that issue-by-issue bargaining may be socially optimal and preferred by one or both parties if players are sufficiently asymmetric, or if bargaining frictions are large.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus).
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100 1 $a Chen, Melvin Keith. $3 1947016
245 1 0 $a Bargaining behind bars: Peer and strategic interactions in theory and data (Saguinus oedipus).
300 $a 111 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1790.
500 $a Adviser: Drew Fudenberg.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.
520 $a This thesis by M. Keith Chen was advised by Drew Fudenberg, David Laibson and Al Roth, and consists of three distinct papers. In the first paper I ask why negotiators often deal with numerous issues by ordering them in an agenda, when in theory separating components of a decision can preclude Pareto—improving tradeoffs. I characterize an extension of Rubinstein bargaining to the multiple-issue setting and show it has a simple and unique equilibrium agenda. Under this equilibrium issue-by-issue bargaining can ameliorate ex-ante bargaining risk, and allow bargainers to make <italic>implicit</italic>, if not <italic>explicit </italic>, tradeoffs between issues, with large distributional consequences. My results suggest that issue-by-issue bargaining may be socially optimal and preferred by one or both parties if players are sufficiently asymmetric, or if bargaining frictions are large.
520 $a In my second paper, I study the US prison system and its effects on inmates post-release lives. Focusing on post-release criminal activity, I identify the effect of prison conditions on recidivism rates by exploiting a discontinuity in the assignment of federal prisoners to security levels. I find that worsening prison conditions significantly increases post-release crime, and that this increase is skewed towards the commission of violent crimes.
520 $a Finally, I study the puzzle of altruistic food giving among genetically unrelated individuals, a phenomenon that has been rarely observed in nature. I present the results of four experiments designed to tease apart the factors mediating food giving among genetically unrelated cotton-top tamarins [<italic> Saguinus oedipus</italic>], a cooperatively breeding New World primate. I show that individuals give significantly more food to a trained conspecific who unilaterally gives food than to one who never gives food, and explore whether food giving can be accounted for by simple reinforcement contingencies, byproduct mutualism, or clearly recognized acts of altruistic food giving. Results from all three experiments show that altruistic food giving is mediated by prior acts of altruistic food giving by a conspecific. Overall, these results provide clear evidence of altruistic food giving among genetically unrelated individuals, indicate that tamarins discriminate between altruistic and selfish actions, and provide the necessary foundation for the evolution of reciprocal altruism.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Psychology, Psychobiology. $3 1017821
650 4 $a Sociology, Criminology and Penology. $3 1017569
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0510
690 $a 0349
690 $a 0627
710 2 0 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-05A.
790 1 0 $a Fudenberg, Drew, $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091532