東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Three essays on financial crises.

Zhu, Haibin.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Three essays on financial crises.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays on financial crises./
作者:	Zhu, Haibin.
面頁冊數:	114 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-10, Section: A, page: 3508.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-10A.
標題:	Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3031028
ISBN:	0493431330

Three essays on financial crises.
Zhu, Haibin.

Three essays on financial crises. - 114 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-10, Section: A, page: 3508.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2001.

This dissertation investigates the role of the banking sector in recent financial crises. The first chapter extends the Diamond-Dybvig model by assuming that agents make their withdrawal decisions sequentially. The new model provides a coordination mechanism among agents and features a unique equilibrium. A bank run would occur if and only if agents perceive a low return on bank assets. It is also shown that banks would deliberately choose a bank-run contract over a run-proof alternative in equilibrium. Based on this new framework, the second chapter explores the welfare effects of various government policies. The results show that: first, suspension of convertibility of deposits, taxation on short-term deposits, and imposition of reserve requirement turn out to be inefficient. Second, deposit insurance is an ex post efficient policy to prevent bank runs. However, deposit insurance is ex ante inefficient as a result of the “moral hazard” problem. The “moral hazard” issue cannot be eliminated even when the insurance scheme is endogenously financed. Finally, imposition of capital requirements is an asymptotically efficient policy to prevent bank crises. As the capital requirement increases, the decentralized equilibrium gradually converges to the first-best allocation. The third chapter, following this line of research, proposes a continuous-time framework that explains why an emerging economy becomes more vulnerable to financial crises after financial liberalization. I show that the access to the world capital market allows the domestic economy to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. However, the banking sector becomes more fragile if international borrowing is wealth-constrained. A temporary shock is amplified and becomes persistent due to the interaction between the value of bank assets and a borrowing constraint.

ISBN: 0493431330Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Three essays on financial crises.
LDR:02742nmm 2200289 4500 001 1858132
005 20040910110227.5
008 130614s2001 eng d
020 $a 0493431330
035 $a (UnM)AAI3031028
035 $a AAI3031028
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Zhu, Haibin. $3 1945834
245 1 0 $a Three essays on financial crises.
300 $a 114 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-10, Section: A, page: 3508.
500 $a Supervisor: Enrique Mendoza.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2001.
520 $a This dissertation investigates the role of the banking sector in recent financial crises. The first chapter extends the Diamond-Dybvig model by assuming that agents make their withdrawal decisions sequentially. The new model provides a coordination mechanism among agents and features a unique equilibrium. A bank run would occur if and only if agents perceive a low return on bank assets. It is also shown that banks would deliberately choose a bank-run contract over a run-proof alternative in equilibrium. Based on this new framework, the second chapter explores the welfare effects of various government policies. The results show that: first, suspension of convertibility of deposits, taxation on short-term deposits, and imposition of reserve requirement turn out to be inefficient. Second, deposit insurance is an ex post efficient policy to prevent bank runs. However, deposit insurance is ex ante inefficient as a result of the “moral hazard” problem. The “moral hazard” issue cannot be eliminated even when the insurance scheme is endogenously financed. Finally, imposition of capital requirements is an asymptotically efficient policy to prevent bank crises. As the capital requirement increases, the decentralized equilibrium gradually converges to the first-best allocation. The third chapter, following this line of research, proposes a continuous-time framework that explains why an emerging economy becomes more vulnerable to financial crises after financial liberalization. I show that the access to the world capital market allows the domestic economy to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. However, the banking sector becomes more fragile if international borrowing is wealth-constrained. A temporary shock is amplified and becomes persistent due to the interaction between the value of bank assets and a borrowing constraint.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0770
710 2 0 $a Duke University. $3 569686
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 62-10A.
790 1 0 $a Mendoza, Enrique, $e advisor
790 $a 0066
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3031028