東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Bank runs and deposit insurance in d...

Yilmaz, Rasim.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey./
Author:	Yilmaz, Rasim.
Description:	156 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-07, Section: A, page: 2551.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-07A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Banking. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3099049

Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey.
Yilmaz, Rasim.

Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey. - 156 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-07, Section: A, page: 2551.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 2003.

The purpose of this dissertation is to address the policies intended to minimize risks and consequences of banking crises and bank runs in developing countries in the context of a developing country, Turkey. The first part of the study empirically investigates reasons of bank failures in Turkey. The main hypothesis of the investigation is that the presence of full coverage deposit insurance after 1994 worsened the financial position of banks in Turkey through moral hazard and adverse selection. This hypothesis examined by a two stage empirical approach. In the first stage, by constructing a probit model, the author analyzed determinants of privately-owned commercial bank failures in Turkey. In the second stage, the author investigated the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems of full coverage deposit insurance on the financial ratios of the Turkish banking sector by evaluating pre-1994 and post-1994 benchmark-adjusted financial ratios using nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. Our empirical investigation reveals that bank failures in Turkey are positively and strongly correlated with the presence of full coverage deposit insurance. The presence of full coverage deposit insurance after 1994 led to deteriorations in financial ratios of especially small banks, suggesting increased fragility in the Turkish banking sector through moral hazard and adverse selection. These results may suggest that it would be preferable to remove deposit insurance in order to minimize bank failures in Turkey. By looking at the recent bank run on the SFHs in February 2001, the second part of the study analyzed the suggestion above. Our micro-study demonstrates that removal of deposit insurance coverage can exacerbate problems with widespread bank runs since depositors, especially small ones, do not appear to be able to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks during a bank run in Turkey. Thus, we conclude that we need at least limited coverage to protect unsophisticated small depositors. Our case study also illustrates that foreign partnership in the banking sector can potentially be of great value in reducing the probability of banking crises and to overcoming depositors' runs on otherwise healthy institutions in developing countries.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey.
LDR:03129nmm 2200265 4500 001 1857302
005 20040809115646.5
008 130614s2003 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3099049
035 $a AAI3099049
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Yilmaz, Rasim. $3 1945028
245 1 0 $a Bank runs and deposit insurance in developing countries: The case of Turkey.
300 $a 156 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-07, Section: A, page: 2551.
500 $a Chair: Mieke Meurs.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 2003.
520 $a The purpose of this dissertation is to address the policies intended to minimize risks and consequences of banking crises and bank runs in developing countries in the context of a developing country, Turkey. The first part of the study empirically investigates reasons of bank failures in Turkey. The main hypothesis of the investigation is that the presence of full coverage deposit insurance after 1994 worsened the financial position of banks in Turkey through moral hazard and adverse selection. This hypothesis examined by a two stage empirical approach. In the first stage, by constructing a probit model, the author analyzed determinants of privately-owned commercial bank failures in Turkey. In the second stage, the author investigated the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems of full coverage deposit insurance on the financial ratios of the Turkish banking sector by evaluating pre-1994 and post-1994 benchmark-adjusted financial ratios using nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. Our empirical investigation reveals that bank failures in Turkey are positively and strongly correlated with the presence of full coverage deposit insurance. The presence of full coverage deposit insurance after 1994 led to deteriorations in financial ratios of especially small banks, suggesting increased fragility in the Turkish banking sector through moral hazard and adverse selection. These results may suggest that it would be preferable to remove deposit insurance in order to minimize bank failures in Turkey. By looking at the recent bank run on the SFHs in February 2001, the second part of the study analyzed the suggestion above. Our micro-study demonstrates that removal of deposit insurance coverage can exacerbate problems with widespread bank runs since depositors, especially small ones, do not appear to be able to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks during a bank run in Turkey. Thus, we conclude that we need at least limited coverage to protect unsophisticated small depositors. Our case study also illustrates that foreign partnership in the banking sector can potentially be of great value in reducing the probability of banking crises and to overcoming depositors' runs on otherwise healthy institutions in developing countries.
590 $a School code: 0008.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
690 $a 0770
690 $a 0508
710 2 0 $a The American University. $3 1017567
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-07A.
790 1 0 $a Meurs, Mieke, $e advisor
790 $a 0008
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3099049