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Risk preference, correlation choice,...

Yumoto, Yuji.

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Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments./
作者:	Yumoto, Yuji.
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-03, Section: A, page: 1018.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-03A.
標題:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3085142

Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments.
Yumoto, Yuji.

Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments. - 143 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-03, Section: A, page: 1018.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--North Carolina State University, 2003.

I examine properties of worker behavior under promotion tournaments, and discuss their implications for the design of promotion tournaments. Given their tasks, workers will decide how much effort they exert. In addition to this decision-making, they have the opportunity to decide their approaches to perform their tasks within their delegated authority. I define the term approach as a method, way, procedure, plan or project to perform his task, into which a worker infuses his effort. Through their approach choices, they can control the riskiness and correlation of their performances. It is shown that under the loser-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is more than one-half, workers prefer a low risk approach or a common approach which peers also know well; on the other hand, under the winner-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is less than one-half, they prefer a high risk approach or their own original approaches. These results suggest that the loser-selecting tournament is more efficient than the winner-selecting tournament in terms of the cost for implementing high efforts of risk-averse workers. I rigorously show this in the case of three workers. I argue that the winner-selecting tournament is better suited for the upper job levels or for firms in innovative and immature markets or industries; on the other hand, the loser-selecting tournament is better suited for the lower job levels or for firms in stable, mature, or strictly regulated markets or industries. Furthermore, I investigate properties of sabotage under tournaments. Under the one-winner tournament, each worker attacks his peers so as to minimize the maximal value of their expected performances. The sabotage operates to create more homogeneity. Under the one-loser tournament, each worker intensively attacks one peer so as to minimize the minimal value of his peers' expected performance. One worker is intensively attacked by all peers. I argue that the one-loser tournament is more subject to damage by sabotage than the one-winner tournament.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments.
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100 1 $a Yumoto, Yuji. $3 1944959
245 1 0 $a Risk preference, correlation choice, sabotage, and the design of promotion tournaments.
300 $a 143 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-03, Section: A, page: 1018.
500 $a Chair: David J. Flath.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--North Carolina State University, 2003.
520 $a I examine properties of worker behavior under promotion tournaments, and discuss their implications for the design of promotion tournaments. Given their tasks, workers will decide how much effort they exert. In addition to this decision-making, they have the opportunity to decide their approaches to perform their tasks within their delegated authority. I define the term approach as a method, way, procedure, plan or project to perform his task, into which a worker infuses his effort. Through their approach choices, they can control the riskiness and correlation of their performances. It is shown that under the loser-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is more than one-half, workers prefer a low risk approach or a common approach which peers also know well; on the other hand, under the winner-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is less than one-half, they prefer a high risk approach or their own original approaches. These results suggest that the loser-selecting tournament is more efficient than the winner-selecting tournament in terms of the cost for implementing high efforts of risk-averse workers. I rigorously show this in the case of three workers. I argue that the winner-selecting tournament is better suited for the upper job levels or for firms in innovative and immature markets or industries; on the other hand, the loser-selecting tournament is better suited for the lower job levels or for firms in stable, mature, or strictly regulated markets or industries. Furthermore, I investigate properties of sabotage under tournaments. Under the one-winner tournament, each worker attacks his peers so as to minimize the maximal value of their expected performances. The sabotage operates to create more homogeneity. Under the one-loser tournament, each worker intensively attacks one peer so as to minimize the minimal value of his peers' expected performance. One worker is intensively attacked by all peers. I argue that the one-loser tournament is more subject to damage by sabotage than the one-winner tournament.
590 $a School code: 0155.
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
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710 2 0 $a North Carolina State University. $3 1018772
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-03A.
790 1 0 $a Flath, David J., $e advisor
790 $a 0155
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3085142