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An experimental and empirical invest...

Mei, Yu.

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An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions./
作者:	Mei, Yu.
面頁冊數:	121 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-04, Section: A, page: 1264.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9831856
ISBN:	0591847566

An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions.
Mei, Yu.

An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions. - 121 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-04, Section: A, page: 1264.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 1998.

Beginning in 1994, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) started to use auctions for the allocation of scarce radio spectrum licenses. The spectrum auctions have drawn widespread attention as policy makers and economists are interested in how effectively these auctions can raise revenues while promoting efficient allocations. The first chapter provides a broad survey of the PCS auctions and of the developments in Broadband PCS and cellular industries that relate to the PCS auctions. The survey discuss how technology, geography, policy and the firm's industry circumstances affect firms' valuations of the spectrum and are important determinants of the efficient design of the spectrum auctions, as well.

ISBN: 0591847566

An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions.
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245 1 0 $a An experimental and empirical investigation of the FCC's spectrum auctions.
300 $a 121 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-04, Section: A, page: 1264.
500 $a Director: Vernon Smith.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 1998.
520 $a Beginning in 1994, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) started to use auctions for the allocation of scarce radio spectrum licenses. The spectrum auctions have drawn widespread attention as policy makers and economists are interested in how effectively these auctions can raise revenues while promoting efficient allocations. The first chapter provides a broad survey of the PCS auctions and of the developments in Broadband PCS and cellular industries that relate to the PCS auctions. The survey discuss how technology, geography, policy and the firm's industry circumstances affect firms' valuations of the spectrum and are important determinants of the efficient design of the spectrum auctions, as well.
520 $a The presence of different types of communications providers, cellular providers, wireline providers, and new PCS providers, in the PCS auctions lead to asymmetries in valuations and information. In theory, this structure has a qualitative affect on common value auction outcomes. In laboratory experiments, bidders are found to overbid, much like the findings in previous common value auction experiments, however, the less informed bidders suffer from much stronger overbidding than the informed bidders, and this overbidding can persist over many periods. In the presence of overbidding, additional public information reduced the seller's average revenues. Experience and feedback diminishes but does not eliminate overbidding
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9831856