東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Informational asymmetry and incentiv...

Yang, Jun.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence./
Author:	Yang, Jun.
Description:	132 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0285.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-01A.
Subject:	Economics, Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3162177
ISBN:	049696304X

Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence.
Yang, Jun.

Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence. - 132 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0285.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University, 2004.

This dissertation considers the design of compensation contracts when informational asymmetry is present in firms. The first essay focuses on the comparison between restricted stock and stock options for executive compensation, trading off incentives for effort against incentives for earnings management. The second essay examines the impact of disclosure regulation on investment efficiency. The third essay shows that the timing of reward reflects the timing of effort in a continuous-time model with three-sided moral hazard.

ISBN: 049696304XSubjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence.
LDR:03429nmm 2200325 4500 001 1851581
005 20051216102020.5
008 130614s2004 eng d
020 $a 049696304X
035 $a (UnM)AAI3162177
035 $a AAI3162177
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Yang, Jun. $3 893514
245 1 0 $a Informational asymmetry and incentives in firms: Theory and empirical evidence.
300 $a 132 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0285.
500 $a Chair: Philip Dybvig.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University, 2004.
520 $a This dissertation considers the design of compensation contracts when informational asymmetry is present in firms. The first essay focuses on the comparison between restricted stock and stock options for executive compensation, trading off incentives for effort against incentives for earnings management. The second essay examines the impact of disclosure regulation on investment efficiency. The third essay shows that the timing of reward reflects the timing of effort in a continuous-time model with three-sided moral hazard.
520 $a The first essay investigates the implications of stock-based compensation on earnings management, both theoretically and empirically. In particular, the essay addresses the following question: does restricted stock compensation induce more earnings management than stock option compensation? We show that increasing the moneyness of the options intensifies earnings management. Ceteris paribus, restricted stock thereby induces more earnings management than stock options. Our empirical evidence supports these predictions. The lag between the stock/option grants and the induced earnings management lies in the range of one to four years, which is consistent with the typical vesting schedules of restricted stock and stock options. Moreover, we examine theoretically the implications of regulatory changes on the optimal design of stock-based compensation. The results suggest that when accounting standards are improved, more stock options should be granted and with higher exercise prices.
520 $a Incentive contracts mitigate the investment inefficiency caused by asymmetric information but are often difficult to implement, particularly if the legal system does not permit enough pre-commitment. We analyze whether various disclosure regimes solve the incentive problem in a Myers-Majluf model with optimal contracting and renegotiation-proofness. We find that, while the disclosure of the manager's contract alone does not solve the problem, allowing earnings forecasts fixes incentives by eliminating the informational asymmetry about the new issue.
520 $a The third essay derives the optimal contract that provides incentives for employees to work together effectively on projects that develop over time. The optimal timing of compensation reflects the timing of effort with compensation for upfront effort preceding compensation for effort over time. The exact pattern of compensation depends on the relative severity of the agents' incentive problems.
590 $a School code: 0252.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0272
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a Washington University. $3 1250147
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-01A.
790 1 0 $a Dybvig, Philip, $e advisor
790 $a 0252
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3162177